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HOW TO THINK 
HERE are two kinds of thinking, the conscious and T the unconscious. W e  begin of course with conscious 
thinking. W e  chemists spend a great deal of time practis- 
ing our students in manipulative skill; but very few of us 
ever do anything in the way of teaching them to  think. 
Many people do not realize i t ;  but it is not easy to think 
efficiently. Two very difficult things which I have to do are 
to teach graduate students to ask why and how to think. 
I suggest to a graduate student that he try a certain experi- 
ment and I tell him why I expect it to go a certain way. 
After a while he comes back and says that the experiment 
does not go. I ask him why and he looks grieved. T h a t  is 
not his job. I t  takes a t  least a year to get him to asking why. 
Since all small boys ask why, the result of intensive training 
is to put a boy further back in some respects than when he 
started. 
In  about a year one can cure a good man of not asking 
why; but i t  takes a great deal longer than that to teach him 
to think properly. Most people do research by making a 
guess, testing it, making another, testing that, and so on. 
T h e  results obtained are valid only for those conditions and 
usually are not corrected for  the misleading experiment. 
When one gets through, one knows nothing more than that 
the particular guesses were not right. I t  is like four people 
hunting as they usually do for a golf ball. After five minutes 
of that, all one knows is that  the golf ball has not been 
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found; but one does not even know where the ball is not, be- 
cause the ball may have been within an inch of where one was 
looking. If the four people plus caddies line up and walk 
down a stretch, one at  least knows that the ball is not there 
a t  all, which is something. 
During the war I happened to be connected with a group 
which was asked to report on a difficulty in regard to  the 
chemical manufacture of ammonium picrate. Instead of 
being all one color, the salt crystallized a t  times with both 
red and yellow on the same crystal. Nobody knew whether 
the bicolored salt was any less satisfactory than a uniformly 
colored product; but it did not meet the specifications. From 
the point of view of the W a r  Department the work of the 
group was eminently successful, because rules were laid 
down which prevented the formation of parti-colored 
crystals. From a scientific view-point the work of the group 
was inconceivably bad. When we finished, we knew less 
about the theory of the subject than when we started be- 
cause we had apparently eliminated all possible explana- 
tions. T h a t  merely meant bad planning and faulty experi- 
mental work. I have always looked upon the particular in- 
vestigation as a model of what scientific research should not 
be, although there are people who point with pride to it. 
This sort of thing is not uncommon. There has been a 
lot  of work done on the action of radium and of ultraviolet 
light on gems, and the net theoretical outcome is practically 
zero.’ “When we come to the color of gems, we get into 
an absolutely unknown country. In many cases a reversible 
change is possible. H e a t  makes the gem colorless, ultra- 
violet gives it one color, and radium (usually beta and 
gamma rays) give it another color.2 Colorless topaz is 
Bancroft: “Applied Colloid Chemistry,” 254 (1926). 
* Cf. Meyer and Przibram: 2. physik. Chem., ZOO, 344  (1922). 
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made yellow to orange by radium and heating makes it color- 
less again. Ultraviolet light tends to  change the radium 
orange to lilac. Kunzite changes from lilac to green, under 
the action of radium, while ultraviolet light reverses this 
change.' Heating makes it colorless and radium restores 
the green color. This cycle' can be repeated indefinitely. 
Blue sapphires are changed to yellow by radium and yel- 
low sapphires to  blue by ultraviolet light. Sapphires become 
colorless when heated and white sapphires are turned yel- 
low by radium. Newbery and Lupton' report that  all the 
colored fluorspars are decolorized when heated. Radium 
restored the green to a decolorized green crystal but 
changed a decolorized yellow one first to blue and then to 
purple. Garnett* quotes Soddy to the effect that colorless 
gold glass is turned ruby color by radium emanation, and 
Ramsay to the effect that  colorless silver glass is turned 
yellow under these conditions; but Lind was not able to 
duplicate these results, perhaps because he used a different 
glass. Lind found that a yellow diamond was turned green 
by alpha rays and went back to yellow when heated. T h e  
green may have been due to a production of blue which dis- 
appeared on heating, the yellow being permanent. T h e  ruby 
becomes green when heated and red again on cooling; this 
is not a case of selective emission a t  higher temperatures. 
"We do not know to  what extent the color changes are 
due to a change in the size of the particles or to a chemical 
change. Cathode rays set free metallic sodium from sodium 
chloride crystals. T h e  wise thing would be to start with the 
oxides of copper, manganese, chromium, and iron in a borax 
1 This change is undoubtedly due to chromic oxide. 
'Lind and Bardwell: J. Franklin Inst., 196, 375, 521 (1923). 
SMemoirs Manchester Phil. SOC., 62, No. 10 (1918). 
Phil. Trans., 203 A, 400 (1904). 
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bead and study the color changes there before trying to  
straighten out the behavior of gems.” 
Since this was written, we have shown that the color of 
the ruby is due to a red modification of chromium oxide, 
that  the amethyst color produced by manganese is due to 
manganic oxide, Mn203,  and that the green color obtained 
with copper oxide in lead glazes is due to the unsuspected 
presence of cuprous oxide. When we shall have cleared up 
the colors due to the oxides of titanium and iron, we shall 
be in a position to study the effect of radium and of ultra- 
violet light on beads containing these oxides, after which it 
will undoubtedly be a simple matter t o  account for  the be- 
havior of gems. This will illustrate the advantage of a 
flank attack. Hitherto, people have merely collected data 
and have not planned their work a t  all. 
Plotnikow’ says that “the amounts of substance changed 
in the whole region of photochemical absorption is propor- 
tional to the absorbed quantity of light, independent of the 
wave-length.” So fa r  as one can judge, this relation cannot 
be true if the nature of the reaction changes with the wave- 
length of the photochemically active light. If so, this is 
tantamount to saying that the nature of the reaction is inde- 
pendent of the wave-length of the photochemically active 
light. H. S. Taylor also believes that light can produce no 
localized increment of energy and that the molecules will 
break a t  the weakest points regardless of where the light 
enters. One would have supposed that a question like this, 
which is fundamental, would have been tested carefully ; but 
the ordinary thinking is so inefficient that  there is very little 
evidence either way and what little evidence there is about 
balances. 
H. S. Taylor thinks that one of the mercury lines 
“Lehrbuch der Photochemie,” 5 5  (1920). 
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decomposes formic acid in two ways, into carbon monoxide 
and water and into carbon dioxide and hydrogen. As fa r  as 
i t  goes, that  is pretty conclusive that monochromatic light 
may act in two ways, though one does not quite see why there 
should be two weakest points. As against this we have the 
experiments of Berthelot and Gaudechon' that light with a 
wave-length longer than 3 0 0 ~  decomposes acetaldehyde 
according to  the equation CH,CHO= CH,+ CO, while 
light of wave-length about 2 5 0 ~ ~  polymerizes acetalde- 
hyde to para-aldehyde and metaldehyde. These experiments 
have not been confirmed independently; but we are starting 
on this a t  Cornell. 
Destructive criticism is often necessary; but it is not the 
last word. One must eventually present something construc- 
tive. T h e  answer is to be found in the game of twenty ques- 
tions. When I was a small boy, it was a very popular game 
to  try to find, by asking a series of questions, what the others 
had selected. T h e  first question was always: animal, vege- 
table or  mineral? After that  the questions must be ones that 
could be answered by yes or no. It is astonishing what things 
one can find out in this way, if one is not limited to twenty 
questions. T h e  trick was to frame the questions so as to 
eliminate a large portion of the possible field each time and 
to  reach the goal by successive eliminations. Direct guesses 
were usually a waste of time and were not made by the ex- 
perts. T h e  method might be called the either-or method, o r  
the Socratic method. T h e  latter sounds more impressive. 
T h a t  simple little game exemplifies the principles of scien- 
tific research and it would be a good thing if our graduate 
students would play it regularly as part  of their research 
training. 
W e  make use of the principle involved whenever we weigh 
'Compt. rend., 156, 68, 233 (1913). 
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anything on a balance in the laboratory. T h e  student is 
taught to get a weight that  is too low and one that is too high 
and then to  reach the true weight by bringing those two 
limits closer and closer together. If he guesses a t  the true 
weight and then keeps adding weights, he can waste a great 
deal of time. 
Modern naval gunnery is based on the Socratic method or 
on the game of twenty questions as one prefers. As I un- 
derstand it, nobody tries t o  hit the target on the first two 
shots. One shot is put over the target and the other under. 
Once a bracket is established, i t  is a relatively simple mat- 
ter to hit a target on the third shot. 
T h e  advantages of the Socratic method are that one 
eliminates a great many possibilities definitely, that there 
is no error due to changing two variables simultaneously, 
and that one knows exactly where one has failed if that  has 
happened. T h a t  means that the problem can be taken up 
again a t  some later time whenever one sees what the next 
step is. T h e  sources of error are : inadequate exclusiveness; 
experimental error ;  inability to devise an experiment to en- 
able one to distinguish between the mutually exclusive 
alternatives ; inability to  formulate an either-or. 
I t  is not easy to illustrate the application of the Socratic 
method from the literature because the people who have em- 
ployed i t  usually do  not give the mental processes through 
which they have gone and one forgets them in one’s own 
case. One very striking instance has been mentioned in the 
second lecture to illustrate another point. Sir Humphry 
Davy believed that the electrolysis of pure water should 
not give acid and alkali a t  the poles. When he actually ob- 
tained acid and alkali from what he had hoped was pure 
water, he proceeded to run down the sources of error in a 
way which is a model t o  all research men. Davy electro- 
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lyzed distilled water between gold wires in glass vessels 
connected by animal bladder or  by moist strings. When 
the result was unsatisfactory Davy reasoned that the disturb- 
ing factors either came from the connecting fibers or did not, 
so he replaced them by well-washed asbestos. H e  next 
concluded that glass was either a disturbing factor or not, 
and he replaced the glass by agate vessels. Pa r t  of the dis- 
turbance was either due to the agate or i t  was not, so he 
replaced the agate vessels advantageously by gold cones. 
H e  had now apparently eliminated everything except the 
water, so he gave that a special distillation and eliminated 
all acid. His  final conclusion was that the disturbance was 
either due to the air o r  it was not. Working with his spe- 
cially distilled water in gold cones with asbestos connect- 
ing fibers in an atmosphere of hydrogen, he succeeded in 
electrolyzing water without the production either of acid 
or of alkali. 
After looking up all the literature on solarization-the 
reversal of the photographic image-and before making any 
experiments, I wrote down three hypotheses which seemed 
to me to cover the field. T h e  first and most plausible one, 
so fa r  as the available data were concerned, was that the 
phenomenon was due to an oxidizing action of the light. 
This was easily proved wrong because the solarization phe- 
nomena could be duplicated by the action of suitable re- 
ducing agents on the photographic film. I do not remem- 
ber now what the third tentative explanation was, because 
the second one proved to be right, that  the effect is due to 
different rates of development. 
T h e  evidence in regard to  the nature of the latent image 
in photography can be presented in a similar manner.’ 
“Owing to the very slight change in silver bromide on short 
’Bancroft: Trans. Faraday SOC., 19, 249 (1923). 
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exposure, i t  has always been popular t o  assume that the 
latent image is a physical or  allotropic modification. 
Namias’ assumed polymerization, Hurter  and Driffield’ 
depolymerization, Bredig3 mechanical disintegration, Chap- 
man Jones‘ labile form, and Bose5 a mechanical strain. All 
these assumptions, and the further one of von Tugolessow’ 
that the latent image is an oxidation product, were over- 
thrown by the simple fact that all the phenomena of the 
latent image can be duplicated by immersing the plate in a 
solution of a weak reducing agent,’ such as sodium arsenite. 
This proves that the latent image is some reduction product 
of silver bromide. I t  cannot be a single, definite subhalide 
because no such compound has been prepared, because no 
satisfactory chemical reactions can be assigned to  it, be- 
cause the prolonged action of light does not yield the pure 
compound, and because this hypothesis cannot be reconciled 
with the facts of solarization. 
“The latent image cannot consist of a number of definite 
subhalides because we cannot isolate these in any way or  
give any proof of their existence or  properties, and because 
i t  is absurd to  assume a number of definite subhalides be- 
tween pure silver bromide and silver bromide containing an 
excess of 0.5 per cent silver, when one can account for all 
the facts much better on the assumption of a phase of con- 
tinuously varying composition. 
“The latent image cannot be free metallic silver (nucleus 
‘“Chimie photographique,” 102, 110 (1902). 
*Phot. J., 22, 149 (1898). 
3Eder: Jahrbuch der Photographie, 13, 365 (1899). 
4‘LScience and Practice of Photography,” 383  (1904). 
SPhot. J., 26, 146 (1902). 
6Phot. Correspondenz, 40, 594 (1903). 
‘Bancroft: J. Phys. Chem., 14, 294; Perley: 689 (1910) ; Clark: British J. 
Photography, 69, 462 (1922) I 
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theory) because it does not show the chemical reactions of 
free metallic silver, because it does not show the electrical 
potential of free metallic silver, and because the hypothesis 
cannot be reconciled with the facts of solarization. 
“The latent image is due to silver adsorbed by silver bro- 
mide because it behaves like a phase of continuously vary- 
ing composition, because this hypothesis enables us to ac- 
count for all the chemical reactions, and because this hy- 
pothesis enables us to account for the facts of solarization. 
T h e  first suggestion that the latent image is due to adsorp- 
tion was made by Carey Lea,’ but this came before people 
were ready for it, and the idea was really carried through 
by Luppo-Cramer.*. . . Hartung’ has shown experimen- 
tally that thin films of silver chloride, bromide, and iodide 
lose weight when exposed in air to the sunlight. This is due 
to  loss of halogen, and the original weight is restored almost 
completely by rehalogenation. As was to be expected, the 
decomposition takes place much more rapidly in a vacuum.” 
The  application of the Socratic method has enabled us 
to make real progress* in the study of the action of salt solu- 
tion on gelatine. Gelatine is peptized by a potassium iodide 
solution much more readily than by a potassium chloride 
solution. It is a typical case of the Hofmeister series. 
Either the peptization is due to  strong adsorption of the 
iodide ion or it is not. Nobody has been able to show any 
marked adsorption of the iodide ion and the effect cannot 
be due to this because the order of peptization by iodides 
and chlorides does not reverse as we change from a slightly 
acid to a slightly alkaline solution. Excluding adsorption 
also excludes compound formation. 
‘Am. J. Sci., ( 3 )  33, 349 (1887). 
2 Cf. “Kolloidchemie and Photographie,” 70 (1908). 
J. Chern. SOC., 121, 682 (1922). 
4Bancroft: J. Phys. Chem., 30, 1194 (1926). 
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The  effect is either due to  the solvent action of potassium 
iodide or  it is not. W e  cannot be dealing with a solvent ac- 
tion of liquefied potassium iodide because the gelatine is 
peptized and not dissolved. It cannot be a peptization by 
liquefied potassium iodide because that would mean a selec- 
tive adsorption of iodide which we do not have. W e  may 
assume that the effect is due to hydration of potassium 
iodide or  is not. So long as people believe that potassium 
iodide is more hydrated than potassium chloride, this can- 
not be true because the formation in solution of hydrates of 
potassium iodide would decrease the amount of free water 
and would therefore decrease the peptizing action of the 
solution of gelatine. 
Since we have apparently excluded any direct action on 
the gelatine, the only remaining possibility is that  potassium 
iodide changes the water so as to increase the water’s peptiz- 
ing action on gelatine. This  is the more plausible because 
the Hofmeister series for  chloride, bromide, and iodide 
crops up in one form or  another as affecting all sorts of phe- 
nomena from the apparent hydrogen ion concentration to  
the temperature of maximum density of water. T h e  mechan- 
ism of the effect is easy to see. Everybody considers liquid 
as an associated liquid with a reversible equilibrium between 
hydrol ( H20)  , dihydrol ( H20)  2, trihydrol ( H 2 0 . )  and 
perhaps polyhydrol (H20), .  Sutherland considers that  
a t  zero liquid water consists practically of 37 per cent tri- 
hydrol and 63 per cent dihydrol. 
T h e  addition of a salt will displace the water equilibrium, 
whatever it may be, in the direction of the form in which 
the salt is more soluble. Since the two forms will not neces- 
sarily have the same peptizing action on gelatine, displace- 
ment of the water equilibrium may increase or  decrease the 
peptizing action on gelatine. Since potassium chloride, 
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bromide, and iodide increase the lowering of the tempera- 
ture of maximum density of water, we conclude for the 
present that these salts increase the percentage of dihydrol, 
and that dihydrol has a greater peptizing action on gelatine 
than trihydrol has. 
This could not have been predicted in advance and we 
know one case where the polymerized liquid is the active 
substance. Pyroxylin is peptized by an ether-alcohol mixture 
and not by either pure liquid a t  room temperature. Ethyl 
alcohol causes pyroxylin to swell appreciably, while ethyl 
ether does not. It has been shown by Lunge' and confirmed 
by Byron' in the Cornell laboratory that the ether appar- 
ently plays no direct part  in the peptization of pyroxyIin. I t  
must therefore activate the alcohol either by increasing or  
decreasing the relative amount of depolymerized alcohol. 
One would expect a dilution of the alcohol to increase the 
relative amount of depolymerized alcohol; but this is ap- 
parently not the case. If the depolymerized alcohol is the 
peptizing agent, i t  should be possible to peptize pyroxylin 
by alcohol alone a t  higher temperatures, as one can do with 
gelatin and water. If the polymerized alcohol is the peptizing 
agent, i t  should be possible to peptize pyroxylin by alcohol 
alone a t  lower temperatures. It has been shown by McBain3 
and confirmed by Byron that there is no appreciable peptiza- 
tion of pyroxylin by alcohol a t  140". It has been shown by 
Kugelmass' and by McBain, and confirmed by Byron, that 
pyroxylin is peptized by alcohol a t  very low temperatures. If 
the hypothesis is right, a colloidal solution prepared a t  low 
temperatures should become more viscous as the tempera- 
12. angew. Chem., 14, 538  (1901). 
e J. Phys. Chem., 30, 1116 (1926). 
3McBain, Harvey and Smith: J. Phys. Chem., 30, 312 (1926). 
'Rec. Trav. chim., 41, 751 (1922). 
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ture rises, because the relative amount of the peptizing agent 
decreases with rising temperature. It has been shown by 
McBain and confirmed by Byron that a colloidal solution of 
pyroxylin in alcohol, which is quite mobile a t  low tempera- 
tures, becomes a soft flowing jelly a t  room temperatures. It 
has been shown by Byron that this soft,flowing mass becomes 
a stiff jelly when heated well above loo”,  and that the tube 
can be turned upside down without the contents flowing out. 
While we have no independent confirmation as yet of the 
assumption that ether increases the polymerization of ethyl 
alcohol, Centnerzwer and Zoppi’ have shown that “ether 
causes great polymerization of methyl alcohol.” 
One of the Cornel1 non-resident lecturers in chemistry, 
Professor Barger of the University of Edinburgh, said in 
one of his lectures that he could not guess how Steenbock 
got the happy idea of irradiating food to  increase the 
vitamin D content. I do not know Steenbock; but I know 
how his mind ought to  have worked and, therefore, how i t  
probably did work. I t  was known that irradiating people 
was equivalent to  increasing the amount of Vitamin D in 
the food. This might be due either to  the action of light 
on some actual constituent of the food or to  the action of 
light on some decomposition product of the food. T h e  way 
to distinguish between these two hypotheses was to  try the 
action of light on the food itself. While Steenbock’s dis- 
covery may have been a happy accident, I prefer to  believe, 
and shall believe until I am proved wrong, that Steenbock’s 
discovery was the result of first-class thinking along proper 
lines. 
It seems to be quite clear that  the Socratic method, as 
defined, is the proper way to do conscious, scientific think- 
ing, and that graduate students should practise themselves 
12. physik. Chem., 5#, 700 (1906). 
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in this as much as possible. When we consider unconscious 
thinking we come into a field in which most of the psycholo- 
gists are quite definitely on one side and most of the research 
men in other sciences equally definitely on the other side. 
I t  seems to be generally recognized that scientific ideas 
seem often to be an inspiration. Whewell’ says that “scien- 
tific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought, 
of which we cannot trace the origin-some fortunate cast of 
intellect rising above all rules. No maxims can be given 
which will inevitably lead to discovery. No precepts will 
elevate a man of ordinary endowments to the level of a man 
of genius.” 
Libby’ says that “it will be found that scientific discovery, 
while predominantly an intellectual process, varies with the 
nature of the phenomena of the different sciences and the 
individual mental differences of the discoverers. As stated 
a t  the outset, the psychology of scientific discovery must be 
the subject of prolonged investigation, but some data are 
already available. One great mathematician, Poincari, at- 
tributes his discoveries to intuition. T h e  essential idea comes 
with a sense of illumination. I t  is characterized by sudden- 
ness, conciseness, and immediate certainty. It may come 
unheralded, as he is crossing the street, walking on the cliffs, 
or stepping into a carriage. There may have intervened a 
considerable time free from conscious effort on the special 
question involved in the discovery. PoincarC is inclined to ac- 
count for these sudden solutions of theoretical difficulties on 
the assumption of long periods of previous unconscious 
work. 
“There are many such records from men of genius. A t  
the moment the inventor obtains the solution of his problem 
l“Novum Organum Renovaturn,” 4 4  (1858) .  
2“An Introduction to the History of Science,” 267 (1917). 
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his mind may seem to be least engaged with it. T h e  long- 
sought-for idea comes like an inspiration,’ something freely 
imparted rather than voluntarily acquired. No mental 
process is more worthy of common respect; but i t  may not 
lie beyond the possibility of explanation. Like ethical in- 
sight, or  spiritual illumination, the scientific idea comes to  
those who have striven for it. T h e  door may open af ter  we 
have ceased to knock, or the response come when we have 
forgotten that we have sent a call; but the discovery comes 
only after conscious work. T h e  whole history of science 
shows that it is to the worker that  the inspiration comes, 
and that new ideas develop from old ideas.” 
Westaway’ has an interesting page on the intuitions of 
great minds. “There are times in men’s thinking when great 
truths seem to dawn upon the mind. On  such occasions there 
is commonly not only simple intuition, but also the gathered 
wisdom of long and varied and ripened experience, refined 
analysis and generalization, conscious reasoning, exceptional 
talent, and systematic methods of working. In  nearly every 
great discovery there has been a combination of native gift, 
accumulated experience, and connected reasoning; a t  some 
particular moment a truth has flashed upon the vision as if 
light from many sources were suddenly focussed on the 
same point. 
In science and mathematics, intuition is recognized as a 
legitimate mode of discovering truth. In  the integral cal- 
culus, fo r  instance, numerous results have been arrived a t  
intuitively, and the clue to all mathematical problems is ob- 
tained by an intuition or  insight which is due partly to native 
capacity and partly to  knowledge and previous experience, 
As t o  the fruitful hypotheses that have led so often to veri- 
( (  
1 [Cf. for instance, Helmholtz in Ostwald: “Grosse Manner,” 302 (1909).] 
2“Science and Theology,” 251 (1920). 
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fiable results in natural science, they seem to be almost of 
the nature of inspired guessing: truth seems to flash across 
the mind of the inquirer immersed in his research. H e  be- 
comes aware of something of which a moment before he was 
not aware. H e  is not conscious of having arrived at it by 
any process of logical thinking, but it has dawned upon him. 
Great scientific discoverers are men who appear to possess 
almost a genius for  the intuition of hitherto unknown facts. 
So suddenly does the intuition come, without any conscious 
process of deductive or  inductive reasoning, that  i t  is some- 
times regarded as a supra-rational faculty. F o r  the moment 
i t  seems to be more akin to imagination than to logic, being 
creative and spontaneous, apparently independent of the 
mental processes of analysis and synthesis which constitute 
the ordinary machinery of thought. But in such cases rea- 
soning and intuition are probably always complementary 
processes; alone, neither is sufficient. Logic does not dis- 
cover the data with which i t  works; the premises of a syllo- 
gism must be known before the inference can be drawn. 
Hence intuition is necessary. But, as we have seen, in- 
tuition is very largely the result of garnered experience, and 
this is brought suddenly into instantaneous action. But in- 
asmuch as the experience is necessarily affected with error, 
the intuitions should always be scrutinised and put to the 
test of truth. Reason should always be called in, even though 
it  be but t o  crystallise the findings of intuition. 
“Just as we talk of the mind being suddenly illuminated 
by a sudden idea, so we talk of the suddenness of a flash of 
lightning. W e  are apt  to forget that  every flash of light- 
ning is the direct result of natural forces gradualIy but in- 
evitably leading up to it, and could, if knowledge had been 
sufficient, have been foretold in the remote past. Things 
are sudden only because we do  not foresee them, and their 
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suddenness is no inherent quality in themselves but the mere 
result of our ignorance. I n  reality, nothing is more sudden 
than anything else. It is from our lack of knowledge, un- 
derstanding, and preparation that  lightning borrows its 
suddenness. 
“All this seems to be equally true in the world of the 
mind. T o  the sudden idea long thinking has contributed- 
thinking which we now seem to be unconscious of. In  our 
unconsciousness seem to  lie some of the greater powers we 
possess. Not a little of man’s capital work is done with- 
out his knowing it, and when it is done he is amazed a t  the 
apparent suddenness of results that  reveal themselves in 
their maturity.” 
Even when we make large allowance for  the enthusiasm 
of biographers and writers of popular science, there can be 
no doubt about the suddenness with which ideas come. 
Koch’ was trying to get the anthrax bacilli pure. “Then one 
day a perfectly easy, a foolishly simple way to watch his 
rods grow flashed into Koch’s head.” More  striking is what 
deKruif says about Metchnikoff :’ “Metchnikoff sat  alone in 
his parlor, tugging a t  his biblical beard, gazing without see- 
ing them a t  his bowls of star fish. Then-it was like the 
blinding light that  bowled Paul over on his way to Damas- 
cuss-in one moment, in the most fantastical you would say 
impossible, flash of a second, Metchnikoff changed his whole 
career.” As Metchnikoff wrote in his diary, “I suddenly 
became a pathologist. . . . Feeling that  there was in this 
idea something of surpassing interest, I became so excited 
that I began striding up and down the room, and even went 
to the seashore to collect my thoughts.” 
1 DeKruif : “The Microbe Hunters,” 113 (1926). 
a [The same phrase is used in regard to Julius Robert Mayer and the laws 
*p.  212. 
of conservation of energy. Ostwald: “Grosse Manner,” 65 (1909) . ]  
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Although Jastrow’ does not himself believe in inspira- 
tion, he records some instances where this seems to occur. 
“Among recorded instances of important discoveries emerg- 
ing into consciousness a t  such indirect moments of leisurely 
occupation, ‘when the mind is a t  lullaby,’ I have noted the 
following :- 
“Sir William Rowan Hamilton evolved the intricate con- 
ception of the invention of quaternions while walking with 
Lady Hamilton in the streets of Dublin, the flash of discov- 
ery coming to  him just as he was approaching the Brougham 
Bridge. Mozar t  had the aria of the beautiful quartette in 
the ‘Magic Flute’ come to him while playing a game of 
billiards, and seemed prepared for  such occasional influxes 
of musical ideas by carrying a note-book for  their instant 
record. An inventor suddenly conceived the proper way of 
constructing a prism for  a binocular microscope-a problem 
which he had long thought of and abandoned-while read- 
ing an uninteresting novel. Professor Kekuli tells how he 
saw the atoms dancing about in mid-air in conformity with 
his theory of atomic grouping, while riding on top of a Lon- 
don bus. In the attempt to recall a name that is on the tip 
of the tongue many persons deliberately occupy themselves 
with something irrelevant, finding by experience that this is 
an aid;  and the day-dream through which flashes a happy 
‘Eureka,’ o r  the dream of deeper sleep that discovers the 
treasures that our laborious digging has failed to  unearth, 
are equally instances in which the fixed intent of the more 
watchful consciousness is withdrawn.” 
In another place’ Jastrow says : “Without maintaining 
that the extremely variable, even discordant, descriptions 
1 “The Subconscious,” 94 (1906). 
‘Ibid., p. 70. 
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recorded by inventors, artists, composers, authors, and 
others in regard to  the genius of their several pursuits, a t  
all supply what the psychologist is interested in discovering, 
it may none the less be profitable to  consider one such ac- 
count-that of Robert Louis Stevenson-for the suggestive- 
ness of the matter which it so attractively presents. It 
pleases this master of imaginative construction to speak of 
the moments of inspiration as coming to him in dreams,- 
waking as well as sleeping dreams, we may assume,-and 
the subconscious contributors to his inventions are made to 
appear as Brownies. 
“This dreamer (like many other persons) has encoun- 
tered some trifling vicissitudes of fortune. When the bank 
begins to send letters and the butcher to linger a t  the back 
gate, he sets to belaboring his brains after a story, for  that  is 
his readiest money-winner; and behold! a t  once the little 
people begin to bestir themselves in the same quest, and la- 
bor all night long, and all night long set before him trun- 
cheons of tales upon their lighted theatre. No fear of his be- 
ing frightened now; the flying heart and the frozen scalp are 
things bygone ; applause, growing applause, growing inter- 
est, growing exaltation in his own cleverness ( for  he takes 
all the credit), and a t  last a jubilant leap to wakefulness, 
with the cry ‘I have it, that’ll dol’ upon his lips: with such 
and similar emotions he sits a t  these nocturnal dreams, with 
such outbreaks, like Claudius in the play, he scatters the per- 
formance in the midst. Often enough the waking is a dis- 
appointment; he has been too deep asleep, as I explain the 
thing; drowsiness has gained his little people, they have gone 
stumbling and maundering through their par ts ;  and the play, 
to  the awakened mind, is seen to  be a tissue of absurdities. 
And yet how often have these sleepless Brownies done him 
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honest service, and given him, as he sat idly taking his 
pleasure in the boxes, better tales than he could fashion for 
himself. 
“In spite of this poetical transformation, the psychological 
affinities are recognizable, though fancifully disguised ; and 
when the dreamer comes to hold an accounting for the share 
of his intent and his prompted self in the joint contract, he 
apportions the credit quite fairly. T h e  Brownies ‘are near 
connections of the dreamer’s, beyond doubt; they share in 
his financial worries and have an eye to the bank book; they 
share plainly in his training; they have plainly learned like 
him to build the scheme of a considerable story and to 
arrange emotion in progressive order ; only I think they have 
more talent; and one thing is beyond doubt, they can tell 
him a story piece by piece, like a serial, and keep him all the 
while in ignorance of where they aim.’ They ‘do one half 
my work while I am asleep, and in all human likelihood do 
the rest for me as well, when I am wide awake and fondly 
suppose I do it for myself.’ And though this sensitive writer 
is tempted to suppose that his conscious ego ‘is no story- 
teller a t  all, but a creature as matter of fact as any cheese- 
monger or any cheese, and a realist bemired up to his ears in 
actuality,’ the reader cannot share this doubt. Stevenson 
comes again upon psychological ground when he says: ‘I 
am an excellent adviser, something like Molikre’s servant ; 
I pull back and I cut down; and I dress the whole in the best 
words and sentences that I can find and make; I hold the 
pen, too; and I do the sitting a t  the table, which is about the 
worst of i t ;  and when all is done, I make up the manuscript 
and pay fo r  the registration; so that on the whole, I have 
some claim to share, though not so largely as I do, in the 
profits of our common enterprise.’ 
“Dr. Holmes similarly acknowledges the portion of our 
How to Think 305 
subconscious acquisitions in our successes, and tells us that 
‘we are all more or  less improvisators; we all have a double, 
who is wiser and better than we are, and who puts thoughts 
into our heads, and words into our mouths,’ yet equally 
does he realize that the inspiring source of these subcon- 
scious thoughts is really the conscious ‘grinding’ self.” 
There is a very wide-spread recognition among people 
who are not psychologists of the possible importance of the 
subconscious mind. Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks of 
those subconscious products of our intelligence wrought in 
the underground workshop of thought. H e  also says : “We 
wish to remember something in the course of conversation. 
No effort of the will can reach i t ;  but we say, ‘Wait a minute 
and i t  will come to me,’ and go on talking. Presently, per- 
haps some minutes later, the idea we are in search of comes 
all a t  once into the mind, delivered like a prepaid bundle, 
laid a t  the door of consciousness like a foundling in a basket. 
How it  came there we know not. T h e  mind must have been 
a t  work groping and feeling for i t  in the dark;  it cannot have 
come of itself. Yet all the while, our consciousness, so far  
as we are  conscious of our consciousness, was busy with other 
thoughts.” 
In “The Three Hostages” by John Buchan, the doc- 
tor says: “I belong to  more or  less the same totem as you, 
but I’ve long been aware that I possessed a most curious 
kind of subconsciousness. I’ve a good memory and fair 
powers of observation, but they’re nothing to those of my 
subconscious self. Take  any daily incident, I see and hear, 
say about a twentieth part  of the details and remember 
about a hundredth part-that is, assuming that there is 
nothing special to stimulate my interest. But my subcon- 
scious self sees and hears practically everything and remem- 
bers most of it. Only I can’t use the memory, for I don’t 
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know that I’ve got it, and can’t call it into being when I wish. 
But every now and then something happens to turn on the 
tap of the subconscious, and a thin trickle comes through. I 
find myself sometimes remembering names I was never 
aware of having heard, and little incidents and details I 
had never consciously noticed. Imagination, you will say, 
but it isn’t, for everything that that inner memory provides is 
exactly true. I’ve tested it. If I could find some way of 
tapping it a t  will, I should become the first scientist of the 
age, for  the trouble with investigation and experiment is 
that the ordinary brain does not observe sufficiently keenly 
or remember the data sufficiently accurately.” 
Since Mr.  Buchan is not primarily a research man, one 
cannot hold it against him that he believes in the Baconian 
method of research-collecting data and having the gen- 
eralizations become self-evident. The  important thing 
is that the existence of what he calls the subconscious 
self is perfectly obvious to him and is not a speculative 
hypothesis. 
W e  get exactly the same thing in a slightly different form 
from John St. Loe Strachey in “The Adventure of Living.” 
“There is another point in regard to Senior’s power of re- 
cording conversations which is worth considering by modern 
psychologists. It is quite possible that what Senior did, un- 
consciously of course, was to trust to his subconsciousness. 
T h a t  amiable and highly impressionable, if dumb, spirit 
which sits within us all got busy when Thiers or Guizot 
was talking. T h e  difficulty was to get out of him what he 
had heard and had a t  once transferred to  the files in the 
Memory Cupboard. Senior, without knowing it, had, I 
doubt not, some little trick which enabled him to get easily 
en rapport with his subconsciousness, and so tap the rich and 
recently stored vintage. H i s  writing was probably half 
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automatic. It certainly was vivid and dramatic in a high 
degree .” 
Emerson’s phraseology’ is quite different of course ; but he 
is also speaking about a thing that is real to him. “Our spon- 
taneous action is always the best. You cannot with your 
best deliberation and heed come as close to any question as 
your spontaneous glance shall bring you, while you rise from 
your bed, or  walk around in the morning after meditating 
the matter before sleep on the previous night. Always our 
thinking is a pious reception. Our truth of thought is there- 
fore vitiated as much by too violent direction given by our 
will, as by too great negligence.’’ 
“ I t  is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns, 
that beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious intel- 
lect he is capable of a new energy (as  of an intellect doubled 
on itself), by abandonment to the nature of things; that, 
besides his privacy of power as an individual man, there is 
a great public power on which he can draw, by unlocking, 
a t  all risks, his human doors, and suffering the ethereal tides 
to roll and circulate through him: then he is caught up into 
the life of the Universe, his speech is thunder, his thought 
is law, and his words are universally intelligible as the plants 
and animals. The  poet knows that he speaks adequately, 
then, only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or ‘with the 
flower of the mind’; not with the intellect used as organ, but 
with the intellect released from all service, and suffered to 
take its direction from its celestial life; or, as the ancients 
were wont to express themselves, not with intellect alone, but 
with the intellect inebriated by nectar. As the traveller who 
has lost his way throws his reins on his horse’s neck, and 
trusts to the instinct of the animal to find his road, so must 
we do with the divine animal who carried us through this 
1‘‘Ewiay8,” 5, 232, 279 ( 1 9 0 6 ) .  
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world. Fo r  if in any manner we can stimulate this instinct, 
new passages are opened for us into nature, the mind flows 
into and through things hardest and highest, and the meta- 
morphosis is possible.’’ 
There is no doubt as to what Buchan and Strachey are 
trying to say; but one can read almost anything into Emer- 
son’s words. I think that the main difference is that  Buchan 
and Strachey consider that what one calls inspiration comes 
from within, whereas Emerson implies that one opens the 
windows of his mind and lets the inspiration blow in from 
outside. Emerson seems to eliminate the subconscious self 
thereby; but i t  is a little obscure whether the “divine horse” 
is internal or  external. 
In  an address given ten years ago, Graham Lusk’ dis- 
cussed the question of research in medicine. “Helmholtz, 
on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, stated that he 
had never had a great idea come to him when he was a t  his 
desk, nor when he was tired, nor after taking a glass of 
wine ; but usually such had come to him when he was walking 
in the garden musing of other things. The  scientist must 
have leisure to think over the problems which offer and 
he must have a certain discrimination in order to distin- 
guish between the things that are worth doing and those 
which are not. T o  do this requires a certain delay in action 
in order that plans may be matured. T h e  individual who can 
not be happy unless he is a t  work a t  full power all the time 
is much less likely to accomplish successful scientific work 
than he who will not commence a research until he has satis- 
fied himself that it is worth doing. I t  is not to be denied 
that this essential qualification of scientific life is frequently 
regarded with scorn by the busy practitioner of medicine who 
gives himself no time either for thought or  discovery.” 
‘Science (2)  48, 634 (1918). 
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T h e  ordinary man, in trying to describe his experiences, 
usually speaks of a subconscious self or  a subliminal self; 
but both of these terms are anathema to the psychologists, 
partly because these latter mean something different by 
these terms from what other scientific men mean. Jastrow’ 
furnishes a striking instance of this. 
“While confining the exposition to  what is offered as the 
most convincing interpretation, it is well to appreciate the 
attitude of a differently derived and maintained survey. An 
opposite theory has framed its conception upon a funda- 
mental emphasis of the schism of conflicting personalities, 
and upon the exceptional nature of allied phenomena. To  
account for these, it supposes the existence in the mental con- 
stitution from the outset and in all its phases, of a factor 
wholly different from any here recognized, a pervasive in- 
fluence in the psychic organism that only in exceptional cir- 
cumstances becomes articulate, and is thus hampered in 
its expression, because until released from the thrall of or- 
dinary consciousness, it cannot throw off its enforced silence. 
I t  awaits the rare conjunction of circumstances and tempera- 
ment, and then shoots forth in spontaneous perfection. It 
reaches independent expression in the emergence of a new 
personality, in the exaltations of trance, in the superior sus- 
ceptibilities of hypnosis, in the inspirations of genius, in the 
peculiar endowments of gifted souls. T h e  issue may be most 
tangibly presented when applied to the interpretation of the 
calculating prodigies, whose performances certainly exhibit 
a more than ordinary development of some type of sub- 
conscious facility. In  giving name to the theory in ques- 
tion, let i t  be the designation in common use among its ad- 
herents : that  of the subliminal self. It admits that  a decided 
proficiency in rapid calculation may be developed upon the 
T h e  Subconscious,” 532, 537 (1906). 
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basis of intensive cultivation and natural talent, and that 
performance so achieved may indeed be notable; but it re- 
gards certain of these performances as not thus applicable, 
but as evidence of a wholly different mode of procedure. It 
points out that  the performers are often boys of no high 
order of general intelligence, whose own accounts of their 
training and methods contain no adequate basis for such ex- 
treme facility, and who, indeed, regard themselves as the re- 
ceptive instruments of a faculty that is somehow exercised 
through the agency of their mind, which passively receives 
the solutions as a revelation. 
“While admitting, as applied to our general proficiencies, 
that much of our intercourse is replete with short-circuiting 
processes, that  our notes of experience are recorded in a 
mixture of long-hand and short-hand characters, in the in- 
terpretation of which we have acquired a facile talent, the 
view in question none the less holds that in unusual cases, 
characters appear that are not stenographic records of ordi- 
nary experience a t  all, but are of an independent alphabet, 
and bear a message removed from the ken of the mind that 
is ordinarily directive. 
“In development of this conception, the theory discovers 
in hypnosis the exercise of a power by which is thus sub- 
liminally revealed knowledge that has no origin in the ex- 
periences open to the self that  responds to the ordinary 
vicissitudes of life. It regards hallucinations as of the same 
status, and attempts t o  determine their import not from 
inner analysis, but from the detailed conformity of their 
content to objective fact, a t  times in anticipation of the fu- 
ture, a t  times in overcoming temporal and special limita- 
tions. T h e  exalted sensibilities of hysteria are similarly 
appraised; and alterations of personality become the most 
explicit expression of a release of the confined subliminal 
How to Think 31 1 
self, whose experiences, though seemingly trivial and chaotic, 
and for the most part  admittedly decadent, are akin to the 
recondite sources from which, by a different use of a com- 
mon privilege, the exceptional man of genius draws his inspi- 
ration, T h e  very latitude of this theory makes it hospitable 
to a wide range of considerations,-many of them supported 
by questionable data and strained interpretations,-and 
renders it liable to  affiliation with ‘occult’ conceptions of 
every shade and grade of extravagance. This  ‘tumbling 
ground for whimsies,’ in Professor James’ phrase, there 
is no obligation to inspect. It is proper to direct attention 
to the serious shortcomings of the theory of the subliminal 
self, when most conservatively framed and when applied in 
the spirit of psychology, not of a plea for the supernatural. 
“To begin with it seems difficult to understand how such 
an independent, and in its essence transcendent capacity 
could have found maintenance in the evolutionary conditions 
of our being. To conceive it as an atavistic function that is 
in its decadence is clearly unnatural, because such functions 
can hardly be concerned with the economies of elaborated 
and highly complex service; atavism is survival from below, 
not a culling from above. It can only be urged that con- 
sciousness is itself a lapsed function, adjusted to the present 
stages of evolution, and has thus replaced a form of psychic 
energy that existed previous to consciousness, and achieved a 
perfection of mental efficiency similar, though superior, to  
that offered by our present form of that privilege; such is- 
sue was attained by service of susceptibilities now lost ex- 
cept in sporadic instances. Those who courageously em- 
brace this view relieve themselves of further obligations to 
provide for subliminal functioning in normal life, and may 
be driven to  this position by the difficulty of finding a place 
in the evolutionary field fo r  a function of such occasional 
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service and yet of such high potency and independent status. 
The  feeble support that  the conception finds when gauged 
by evolutionary standards is further disclosed in relation to 
the higher products of mental evolution. It seems a very 
mockery of that process to carry the development of the 
mind as the issue of tortuous and minute steps, laboriously 
and uncertainly attaining to its present stage of efficiency, 
and then to have these endowments and achievements out- 
done by a confined and untutored ‘double,’ that this same 
mind has all the while unwittingly nurtured. A complete 
parallel to such a supposition is not readily found; not 
wholly unlike i t  would be the assumption that the eyes were 
admittedly developed by virtue of their utility as organs 
of vision, but that  somewhere in the bodily economy-say 
under a fold of the skin-there exists an organ that by a sur- 
vived potency from primeval days can now, with suppressed 
experience or  service, occasionally convey to the mind, when 
the eyes are closed or when a saving blindness releases the 
imprisoned sense, the same type of visions as come through 
the retina and yet more exalted ones. Until the conception 
can be better reconciled to evolutionary principles, i t  is 
highly improbable that it will find support by appeal to other 
logical considerations, T h e  theory exposes its further short- 
comings by a necessary admission of a different status for 
that large range of abnormal experience, presenting phe- 
nomena wholly parallel to those that it interprets in its own 
favor, but which are decidedly free from the features that 
require the assumption of the traits ascribed to  the sub- 
liminal self. I t  is the less urgent to enforce these and re- 
lated objections, for the reason that the theory, being but 
slightly restrained by exacting allegiance to  the large body 
of normal data and by the systematic obligations thus in- 
curred, has little difficulty in accommodating itself to the 
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evasion of such objections by yet further complications of 
like hypothetical nature. T h e  Copernicans were quite ready, 
when the observed positions of the planets departed from 
the predictions based upon the supposition of the circular 
orbit, t o  ‘build, unbuild, contrive,’ with ‘cycle and epicycle, 
orb in orb’; the simplicity of the elliptical hypothesis of 
Kepler not alone did away with the cycles great and small, 
but rendered such questionable expedients unnecessary.” 
Even Dr. Morton Prince,’ who believes in subconscious 
reasoning, draws the line a t  a subconscious or subliminal 
self outside of pathological cases. “Through the concep- 
tion of the subconscious as resolvable, on the one hand, into 
the unconscious, passive or  active physiological dispositions, 
and, on the other hand, into coactive conscious states, the 
subconscious becomes simplified and intelligible. It offers 
a basis on which may be constructed comprehensible theo- 
ries of memory, suggestibility, post-hypnotic phenomena, 
dreams, automatic writing and similar phenomena, arti- 
ficial hallucinations, the protean phenomena of hysteria, and 
the psychoneuroses, as well as the mechanism of thought. It 
enables, as well to construct a rational concept of personal- 
ity and self. As we shall see, when we take up the study of 
multiple personality in later lectures, out of the aggregate of 
the accumulated and varied experience of the past conserved 
in the unconscious may be constructed a number of different 
personalities, each depending upon a synthesis and rear- 
rangement of life’s neurograms and innate dispositions and 
instincts. All dormant ideas with their feelings, tones and 
conative tendencies belong to  our personality, but they may 
be arranged with varying instincts and innate dispositions 
into a number of differentiated systems, each synthesized 
into a corresponding personality. In  the unconscious may be 
‘“The Unconscioua,” 255 (1921). 
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conserved a vast number of life’s experiences ranging in time 
almost from the cradle to the grave. T h e  hopes, the 
wishes, the anxieties of childhood may still be there, lying 
fallow, but capable of injecting themselves under favoring 
conditions into our personalities. Properly speaking, from 
this point of view, aside from certain artificial and patho- 
logical conditions, there is, normally, no distinct ‘subcon- 
scious self,’ or  ‘subliminal self,’ or  ‘secondary self,’ or  ‘hidden 
self.’ In artificial and pathological conditions there may be, 
as has been frequently shown, a splitting of consciousness 
and the aggregation into a secondary coconscious system of 
large systems of ideas which have all the characteristics of 
personality. This secondary personality (of which the pri- 
mary personality is not aware) may have its own memories, 
feelings, perceptions, and thoughts. It may appropriate to 
itself various complexes of neurograms deposited by the ex- 
periences of life which are not a t  the disposal of the princi- 
pal personality. Such a coconscious system may properly be 
spoken of as a subconscious self.  But there is no evidence 
that, normally, such systems exist. All that we are entitled 
to affirm is that  every individual’s consciousness may include 
ideas of which he is not aware, and that he has a t  his dis- 
posal, t o  a greater or  less extent, a large unconscious store- 
house in which are neurographically conserved a large and 
varied mass of life’s experiences. These experiences may be 
arranged in systems, as we shall see in the next lecture, but 
they do not constitute a ‘self.’ T o  speak of them as a subcon- 
scious, subliminal, secondary, or hidden self is to construct 
concepts which are allegories, metaphors, symbolisms, per- 
sonifications of concrete phenomena. Their use tends to fal- 
lacious reasoning and to perverted inductions from the facts. 
Becoming major premises in a syllogism they lead to errone- 
ous interpretations of the simplest facts, just as fixed ideas 
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or  obsessions tend to  a perverted interpretation of the 
environment.” 
Munsterberg says that ‘‘there is no subconscious.” Titch- 
ener’ says that “if we refuse to explain mind by body, we 
must accept the one of the two, equally unsatisfactory, al- 
ternatives: we must either rest content with a simple de- 
scription of mental experience, or  must invent an uncon- 
scious mind to give coherence and continuity to  the con- 
scious. Both courses have been tried. But, if we take the 
first, we never arrive a t  a science of psychology; and if we 
take the second, we voluntarily leave the sphere of fact 
for  the sphere of fiction.” 
Woodworth’ considers the question of the apparently 
unconscious solving of problems. “But now for the real 
‘subconscious mind.’ You try to  recall a familiar name, but 
are stuck; you drop the matter, and ‘let your subconscious 
mind work’; and, sure enough, after a few minutes you have 
the name. Or, you are all tangled up in a difficult problem; 
you let the subconscious mind work on i t  overnight, and next 
morning i t  is perfectly clear. Just here i t  is that  psychology 
begins to take issue with the popular idea. T h e  popular 
interpretation is that work has been done on the problem 
during the interval when it was out of consciousness-un- 
conscious mental work of a high order. But is i t  necessary to  
suppose that any work has been done on the problem during 
the interval? T h e  difficulty, when you first attacked the 
problem, arose from false clues which, once they got  you, 
held you by virtue of their ‘recency value.’ T h e  matter laid 
aside, these false clues lost their recency value with lapse 
of time, so that when you took the matter up again you were 
free from their interference and had a good chance to go 
straight towards the goal.” 
“Psychology,” 563 (1921). 
I1‘A Text-Book of Psychology,” 1, 40 (1909). 
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This is an ingenious explanation of what might have hap- 
pened; but, so far  as I am concerned, it is in no sense a state- 
ment of what does happen. 
Gault and Howard’ object to  certain specific uses of terms 
in regard to  unconscious processes. “The psycho-analysts 
are responsible for  having injected several new terms into 
the vocabulary of the psychologists ‘subconscious mind’; 
‘subconscious’; ‘subconscious experience’; ‘ the unconscious.’ 
These terms have been repugnant to psychologists of the 
most conservative sort-and naturally so. For  them psy- 
chology has to  do with consciousness; with conscious pro- 
cesses and nothing more. T h e  unconscious is outside of their 
realm and ‘subconscious mind’ and ‘subconscious expe- 
rience’ are contradictory in themselves. These last terms 
have all but simmered [ ? I  out of existence over the heat 
of discussion pro and con; but the unconscious, in spite of 
philosophy and history, bids fair to prove non-volatile and 
to hold for itself a respectable place in the language of 
psychologists. 
“The word has broad and varied connotations. Many 
nerve impulses do not arouse conscious processes for the 
reason that they do not reach the cortex; and yet they affect 
our behavior most usefully. . . . Many a student has gone 
to bed and fallen asleep after having vainly attempted to  
solve a mathematical problem, and has awakened in the 
morning with the solution all in order. Something had gone 
on in the meantime, albeit unconsciously. It was an uncon- 
scious process.” 
Troland’ is not quite as pessimistic as some of the other 
psychologists, though he is not really very helpful. “Not- 
withstanding continued adversity, we need not abandon all 
1 “Outline of General Psychology,” 407 (1925) .  
2“The Mystery of Mind,” 26, 229 (1926) .  
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hope of finding an intelligible conception of the mind as an 
agency underlying consciousness. W e  have still to examine 
a popular alternative of the unconscious, namely the ‘sub- 
conscious’ mind. As the term suggests, the ‘subconscious’ is 
conceived as a true form of consciousness, which is neverthe- 
less removed from the ordinary awareness of the individual, 
lying psychically ‘under’ the normal consciousness. T h e  sub- 
conscious, in this sense, may possess any or  all of the proper- 
ties of the conscious realm, except continuity or unity with 
the latter. Just as my consciousness is separated from yours 
without either being unconscious or  necessarily different in 
kind, so my subconscious may be cut off from my own con- 
sciousness and still be of the same general nature as the 
latter. Just as your consciousness may influence mine, so in 
even greater measure can my subconscious control the events 
in my conscious field. 
“Here a t  last we have discovered a conception of mind 
which is truly intelligible. Although our idea of the ‘subcon- 
scious mind’ may be somewhat vague, i t  is nevertheless far 
from being a blank word like ‘soul’ or  ‘will.’ However, we 
are not yet out of the woods. W e  know what we mean by 
the subconscious, but have we any proof that such a thing 
actually exists? Some psychologists feel very confident as 
to the reality of the subconscious, but others deny i t  without 
reservation. Nearly all would admit that  the subconscious 
is an hypothesis rather than a fact; its existence cannot as 
yet be proven, but can only be rendered probable through 
its capacity to explain the actual facts. Accordingly if we 
identify the self with the subconscious we leave i t  as a prob- 
lem whether the self really exists. T h a t  would be a rather 
unsatisfactory termination for our search.” 
“In its most significant aspect, consciousness corresponds 
to the recording point in the brain. I t  represents the ‘moving 
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finger’ which writes upon the cortical surface. T h e  central 
brain activity is a formative process. W h a t  it writes is de- 
termined to some degree by what has already been written 
a t  the place where the record is being made. W e  thus con- 
ceive of the central activity as wandering about over the 
association area, always leaving its impress behind it. T h e  
residual activities which continue on the basis of these im- 
pressions correspond with the subconscious mind. T h e  wan- 
dering focus of activity corresponds with consciousness. T h e  
central activity very frequently retraces its movements or 
walks in some of its own footprints, thus bringing the ma- 
terial of the subconscious into consciousness, and combining 
the memory influence with that of the present forces of 
sensation. 
“This view leads us to regard the subconscious on the one 
hand as the product of consciousness, and on the other hand 
as a vast storehouse of materials for the latter. Having once 
discovered these functions of the subconscious, we can sub- 
stitute the latter for the brain in our explanations. Thus 
instead of explaining habit in terms of synaptic resistance, 
we can account for it in terms of some ‘subconscious ten- 
dency.’ Complexes regarded as nerve mechanisms will give 
way to emotional ideas, or the like, regarded as facts of the 
subconscious. The  physiology of the cortex is to a large 
extent eliminated. This does not mean that we deny the 
existence of the cortical structures and activities, but only 
that we can get along without referring to them. Freud’s 
account of his famous theory is given primarily in terms 
of a sentient subconscious rather than in terms of brain 
mechanisms.” 
This is one of the many cases in which the all-important 
thing is to know the special terms in vogue. While i t  is very 
bad form to speak of the subconscious or  subliminal self, i t  
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is possible to convey the same ideas, without giving offense, 
by speaking’ of being outside the margin of consciousness. 
T o  speak of the subliminal self is unpardonable. To speak 
of subconscious thinking is unwise. T o  speak of supra-mar- 
ginal consciousness is to put oneself well out ahead of the 
procession. 
“When speaking colloquially of the content of conscious- 
ness we have in mind those ideas of components of ideas- 
elements of thought-which are in the focus of attention, 
and therefore that of which we are more or  less vividly 
aware. If you were asked to  state what was in your mind a t  
a given moment it is the vivid elements, upon which your at- 
tention was focused, that  you would describe. But, as every- 
one knows, these do not constitute the whole field of con- 
sciousness a t  any given moment. Besides these there is in 
the background of the mind, outside of the focus, a conscious 
margin or fr inge of varying extent (consisting of sensations, 
perceptions, and even thoughts)  of which you are only 
dimly aware. I t  is a sort of twilight zone in which the con- 
tents are  so slightly illuminated by awareness as t o  be 
scarcely recognizable. T h e  contents of this zone are readily 
forgotten owing to  their having been outside the focus of 
attention; but much can be recalled if an effort to do  so 
(retrospection) is made immediately after any given mo- 
ment’s experience. Much can only be recalled by the use 
of the special technical methods of investigation. I believe 
that the more thoroughly this wonderful region is explored 
the richer i t  will be found to be in conscious elements. 
“It must not be thought that, because we are only dimly 
aware of the contents of this twilight zone, therefore the 
individual elements lack definiteness and positive reality. T o  
do  so is to confuse the awareness of a certain something 
‘Morton Prince: “The Unconscious,” 340 (1921). 
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with that something itself. T o  so think would be like think- 
ing that, because we do not distinctly recognize objects in 
the darkness, therefore they are but shadowy forms with- 
out substance. When, in states of abstraction or  hypnosis, 
the ideas of this fringe of attention are recalled, as often is 
easily done, they are remembered as v e r y  definite, real, con- 
scious elements, and the memory of them is as vivid as that 
of most thoughts. T h a t  these marginal ideas are not ‘vivid’ 
a t  the time of their occurrence means simply that they are 
not in such dynamic relations with the whole content of 
consciousness as to be the focus of awareness or  attention. 
W h a t  sort of relations are requisite for  ‘awareness’ is an 
unsolved problem. It seems to  be a matter not only of 
synthesis but of dynamic relations within the synthesis.” 
“Some of these elements may be so distinctly within the 
field of awareness that we are conscious of them, but dimly 
so.’ Others, in particular cases a t  least, may be so far  outside 
and hidden in the twilight obscurity that the subject is not 
even dimly aware of them. In  more technical parlance, we 
may say, they are  so far  dissociated that they belong to an 
ultra-marginal zone and are really subconscious. Evidence 
of their having been present can only be obtained through 
memories recovered in hypnosis, abstraction, and by other 
methods. These may be properly termed coconscious. Un- 
doubtedly the degree of awareness for marginal elements, 
i.e., the degree of dissociation between the elements of the 
content of consciousness, varies a t  different moments in the 
same individual according to  the degree of concentration 
of attention and the character of the fixation, e.g., whether 
upon the environment or  upon inner thoughts. It also varies 
much in different individuals. Therefore some persons lend 
1It is very doubtful whether vivid awareness is a matter of intensity be- 
cause, among other reasons, subconscious ideas of which the individual is 
entirely unaware and elements in the fringe may have decided intensity. 
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themselves as more favorable subjects for the detection of 
marginal and ultramarginal states than others. Further- 
more, according to certain evidence at  hand, there is, in 
some persons a t  least, a constant shifting of interchange of 
elements going on between the field of attention and the 
marginal and the ultra-marginal zone-what is within the 
first a t  one moment is in the second, or  is entirely subcon- 
scious, the next, and vice versa.” 
“If all that  I have said is true, i t  follows that the whole 
content or field of consciousness a t  any given moment  in- 
cludes not only considerably more than that  which is within 
the field of attention but more than is within the field of 
awareness. T h e  field of conscious states as a whole com- 
prises the focus of attention plus the marginal fringe; and 
besides this there may be a true subconscious ultramarginal 
field comprising conscious states of which the personal con- 
sciousness is not even dimly aware.” 
Platt’ is another man who delights in the term, margin. 
“I t  is that  a t  any time we are using but a small portion of 
our available brain patterns. Only a small part  of our 
mental store can be before us a t  any one moment of our 
existence. I t  is as with our eye vision, we see clearly only 
that upon which we focus. From this central point vision 
fades toward the margin where lie but the vaguest sugges- 
tions of sight, and here, a t  the margin, it finally ends. Be- 
yond the margin, however, there lies, we know, a vast world 
not now seen a t  all, but which, piecemeal, can be brought 
into vision by changing the direction of our gaze. In  our 
mental field, likewise, we see only that upon which we focus, 
that  t o  which we give our attention. Beyond this appre- 
ciated field of our present consciousness lies the vastly 
greater field of unconsciousness, the field of the subcon- 
“The Psychology of Thought and Feeling,” 157 (1921). 
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scious mind, where lie all the hundreds of thousands of 
experiences, brain patterns, and emotional potentialities 
which constitute our inheritance and our experience in life. 
‘There are secret and individual parts in the nature of 
men, and mute conditions without show, sometimes unknown 
of their very possessors.’1 
“But let us go a step further-our unseen world is not a 
dead world awaiting our regard before it awakens. It is 
with the mentally unseen world of the subconscious mind 
as it is with the vast world unseen by our eyes. This sub- 
conscious, unconscious mind of ours is by no means the quiet 
storehouse it was once assumed to  be-deep down in the 
unconscious mind things happen. I t  is a storehouse, it  is 
true, but not one of mere inactive waiting. There is going 
on in the unconscious mind, though possibly in modified 
form, the very same processes that are known to our con- 
sciousness. An unconscious cerebration is there taking place, 
a modified activity corresponding in kind to  that we have 
already studied. W e  store away experiences, but these do 
not necessarily, nor generally, remain isolated; they may, 
under certain conditions, form unconscious associations and 
undergo change, and when again brought to consciousness 
may be altered beyond recognition. T o  the old orthodox 
attitude the above is absurd. In the old conception, with 
soul-controlled thought, the unconscious is simply some- 
thing which is not. T h e  poets and philosophers knew better. 
To  them the unconscious has always been very real indeed, 
and so it is to  the psychologist of today. T h e  unconscious, 
it is believed, differs from the conscious merely in not being 
in focus, and in being incomparably greater and richer. 
“We must add one concept more, namely this: that  from 
the unconscious excursions take place in to the conscious and 
1 Montaigne. 
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have an effect on our conscious lives-that there is, in fact, 
a two-way connection between the conscious and the uncon- 
scious, a connection by no means always under the control 
of the will. Take a very simple example of this. You are 
seeking a name; you can not recall i t ;  you finally abandon 
the quest and turn to something else. Suddenly the name 
comes to you-bobs up, as it were, from the unconscious into 
the conscious. While you were thinking of something else, 
the original mental process was contained in the unconscious, 
and there finally found the pattern sought. Or, more elabo- 
rately, we are striving to solve a problem, and can not, and 
give i t  up, and go to bed-and then wake in the morning with 
the answer clearly before us.’ 
“Does not this unconscious cerebration, which, i t  would 
seem, must be accepted, endorse the description of thought 
given earlier? Our picture then was of a nerve force, the 
neurokyme, which once set in action flowed here and there 
until it found the brain pattern which would solve the 
problem presented. 
“The fact that  the unconscious sometimes succeeds better 
than our conscious effort  is explainable, probably, by the 
presence in the latter of a wilful control which may be 
mistaken. Our conscious effort may be in the wrong direc- 
tion, but we, nevertheless, obstinately hold to the path on 
which we have started. Fo r  example ; we are trying to recall 
the name of a man, and we feel sure that it begins with a B; 
so we keep harping on Brown, and Baker, and Bissel, and 
Black-hanging on to  the B idea a t  all costs. But when we 
finally give over the search, the B idea gets dropped also, 
‘“We sleep, but the loom of life never stops; and the pattern which was 
weaving when the sun went down is weaving when it comes up tomorrow.” 
This from Henry Ward Beecherl Though we must acknowledge that what 
he had in mind was quite other than the psycho-physiological phenomenon 
we are considering. 
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and the subconscious, left t o  work i t  out by itself, finally 
finds what we want-the man’s name was Adams. W e  
remember now that we met him in Boston, and this is, of 
course, where the B idea came from. 
“There are examples of simple unconscious cerebration 
and of recovery from the unconscious of facts lying, as it 
were, just beneath the surface. But this subconscious, un- 
conscious region contains many, many other things than 
these temporarily laid aside items. In  the unconscious lie 
all the memories, impressions, and experiences of life; events 
of our childhood, things near, and far  past; things we have 
put away until needed; things we have tried to  forget, and 
things we have forgotten. Here, too, are things we do not 
know and may never know we possess-passing impressions 
which may never have registered in the conscious mind, but 
which were, nevertheless, duly registered in the unconscious. 
Here, too, are our inheritances, our innate dispositions, our 
tendencies; some of them recognized by us a t  times; and 
some of them still but potentialities, their patterns never 
yet having been used, they never yet having received the 
stimulus necessary to set them in action. These last, we shall 
find, are important, for whether chance ever discovers them 
or  not, they are there, and do surely affect, albeit uncon- 
sciously, our thoughts and our actions. Furthermore, being 
unsuspected, their control is neither sought nor obtained. 
“We have reached now to a conception of a vast region 
of unconscious cerebration, from which arise impulses and 
influences which, whether they actually come to conscious- 
ness or not, do, still, profoundly affect our conscious lives. 
From this seething underworld of thought come many of 
the inhibitions, or  stops, which obstruct our conscious accept- 
ances, and from it, too, come many of our calls to action. 
W e  are influenced we know not, consciously, how nor why; 
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and we wonder a t  ourselves-it is the unconscious that is 
pulling ! 
“This conception of the unconscious is not new, i t  is only 
the precise statement of i t  which is new. T h e  poets have 
known it for  ages, it is in this their truth lies; and the 
philosophers, with poetical minds, the only true philoso- 
phers, have endeavoured to express it in words.” 
Seashore‘ also falls into line as soon as the word marginal 
is mentioned. “One of the most debatable issues in psychol- 
ogy pertains to the nature of this receding, marginal con- 
sciousness and what lies beyond, usually spoken of as the 
subconscious or unconscious. T h e  idea of the subconscious 
has been a term to conjure with on the part of all kinds of 
mystery mongers in alleged psychology. Fo r  this there are 
several reasons. It is a field which has not yet been organized 
by systematic experiments in the laboratory, and, therefore, 
its full significance has not been grasped and it has not been 
adequately formulated in scientific psychology. I t  is not 
readily approached through direct introspection. It mani- 
fests itself most conspicuously in abnormal and pathological 
cases. I t  is by its very nature mysterious in that i t  often 
seems to function as a consciousness outside of the personal 
consciousness. In  legitimate psychology it has furnished a 
most satisfactory explanation of the strange, the weird, and 
the apparently supernormal, as in hypnosis, alternating per- 
sonality, and all forms of automatisms and is, therefore, 
resorted to by the ignorant and uncritical as a cover for 
anything which is mysterious to them. This, in turn, has 
made i t  an easy victim for  identification with all sorts 
of uncritical, semi-religious, pseudo-philosophical and quasi- 
scientific theories as to its ultimate nature.” 
“There is a great diversity of opinion among psycholo- 
“Introduction to Psychology,’’ 192, 194, 375 (1923). 
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gists on this subject, but, throughout this book, we are pro- 
ceeding on the theory that the subconscious represents those 
processes which are outside of the focus of our attention to 
processes as related to the waking self. W e  regard the sub- 
conscious as an extension of consciousness, the distinction 
between conscious and subconscious being merely that we call 
those mental processes ‘conscious’ which we are aware of 
experiencing a t  the time of the experience in the waking 
state, and all other mental phenomena subconscious. As in 
the illustration of the landscape above, there is no sharp 
line between the focal region in which distinct features or  
objects are observed in turn and the vast region beyond this 
in which features are massed. 
“The term ‘subconscious’ seems to involve a contradiction. 
There is a tendency to identify conscious and mental; the 
subconscious would, therefore, imply something under the 
mental, not mental. This difficulty, however, rests mainly 
upon a poverty in words. According to  our view, the sub- 
conscious is mental and it is the same kind as the conscious, 
the mental being divided into the conscious and the sub- 
conscious. It is merely remote in a part  of the waking 
system of self-awareness. The  subconscious may be clear, 
discriminating, and organized around a remote personal 
nucleus, just as the conscious is. In the analogy of the paint- 
ing, one’s observation may center about any feature, however 
trifling, to such an extent as to result in utter obliviousness 
to both self and painting as such. Our theory denies the 
assumption that ideas and impressions are stored, as implied 
in one group of theories; it disavows any metaphysical 
assumption in regard to the subliminal as a form of ultimate 
reality; it takes a broader view than the theory which regards 
the subconscious as a split-off fragment; i t  recognizes the 
adequacy of the physiological account of all neural processes 
underlying mentality; i t  recognizes the vastness of the sub- 
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conscious element associated with our ordinary conscious 
life; it draws no sharp lines between the conscious and the 
subconscious; and does not attempt to determine the limit 
of mentality. 
“The dream is a perfect example of the subconscious 
mental process, in that i t  is dissociated from the working 
consciousness of self to the extent that  the dreamer is not 
aware of himself as dreaming and cannot control his 
dreams.” 
Jastrow is really campaigning against the subconscious 
or subliminal self and his book’ contains many helpful things, 
though he apparently does not see the bearing of them as Ido. 
“Unusual activities of the subconscious will, in the main, 
occur only in unusual mental constitutions; normally, the 
emergence of a fairly independent piece of subconscious 
functioning depends upon a moderate variation from the 
standard illumination of conscious attention,-just the dark- 
ening of a passing cloud; abnormally, in favorable cases, 
the measure of its independence is decidedly emphasized and 
its more notable and impressive performances made possible. 
Yet throughout, the phenomena present consistent relations ; 
the several factors that  determine the result vary constantly 
and puzzlingly, and none more so than the individual tem- 
perament, the dominant integer’ in the personal equation.” 
Jastrow: “The  Subconscious,” 62, 68, 95, 99, 159, 449 (1906) .  
* In this respect the mental states of children a re  interesting. Children enter 
into their occupations with a decided intentness and a n  emotional vivacity 
that bury them deep in  the reality of their play;  and they are  likewise free 
from any considerable range of acknowledged claims to their attention. They  
accordingly furnish favorable opportunities for  subconscious activity. At  the 
same time the relative feebleness of their attention and the weakness of their 
habits militate against any very promising field for  the exhibition of such 
subconscious traits. I n  actual observation the effect of both these tendencies 
may be readily observed. Children, if undisturbed, become absorbed in  play 
and are  moat oblivious of what  is going on about them, giving themselves 
singly and intensely to their play-fancies, forgetting their troubles, and occa- 
sionally falling into amusing lapses that  exhibit the subconscious activitica in  
formation. O n  the other hand, they weary quickly, require constant change of 
occupation, and  welcome distraction if i t  is offered. 
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Jastrow quotes with approval the statement by Galton 
that “there seems to be a presence-chamber in my mind 
where full consciousness holds court, and where two or  three 
ideas are a t  the same time in audience, and an antechamber 
full of more or  less allied ideas, which is situated just beyond 
the full ken of consciousness. Out of this antechamber the 
ideas most nearly allied to  those in the presence-chamber 
appear t o  be summoned in a mechanically logical way, and 
to have their turn of audience. . . . T h e  exclusion of alien 
ideas is accompanied by a sense of effort. . . . The  char- 
acter of this effort seems to me chiefly to lie in bringing the 
contents of the antechamber more nearly within the ken 
of consciousness which then takes more comprehensive note 
of all its contents, and compels the logical faculty to  test 
them seriatim before selecting the fittest for a summons to 
the presence-chamber.” And further : “The thronging of 
the antechamber is, I am convinced, altogether beyond my 
control; if the ideas do not appear, I cannot create them, 
nor compel them to  come. 
“All this points t o  the fact that  the large stores of accu- 
mulated learning which we carry in our heads lie in part  near 
the focus of interest that  occupies our immediate attention, 
in greater part  lie in ever widening areas-all permeated 
by an intricate network of highways and byways along which 
the goods of our mind come floating. W h a t  Mr. Leland 
remarks of the work of genius is measurably true for  the 
favored periods of all workers, namely, that  ‘it sweeps 
along, as it were, in a current, albeit i t  has enough reason 
left to also use the rudder and oars, or  spread and manage 
a sail’; and though it  is obvious that we cannot create the 
wind that brings the ship to port, we can guide the rudder 
and show our skill in using what breeze may come. Such a 
conception does not deceive itself that  it explains what in 
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fact it only describes; but i t  places the emphasis a t  the proper 
point, and avoids error by assimilating the unusual t o  the 
usual; i t  prevents the cherishing of false theories by shunning 
the assumption of marvels, and by extending the marvel of 
the commonplace. In  every step of thought there is the 
unaccountable something, the hidden and individual motive 
power that supplies the energy; ‘in the case of small steps, 
even the heavy and clumsy thinker feels sure that he does 
not tr ip;  with greater leaps, however, the danger of stum- 
bling increases, and only the dexterous and nimble attempt 
them with advantage.” Though in time the flights may 
seem longer and more daring, and the contact with the 
earthly realities of consciousness may become so occasional 
and incidental as t o  create the feelings not of steps a t  all 
but of mysterious flight through the air, we may be assured 
that the feeling has no other than a subjective basis. T h e  
enthusiastic prophet of the Unconscious may tell us that  
‘the discursive and deductive method is only the lame walk- 
ing on stilts of conscious logic, whilst rational intuition is 
the Pegasus flight of the Unconscious, which carries in a 
moment from earth to heaven’; yet the psychological ob- 
server cannot fail to notice the long periods of training and 
accumulation of experience that prepare the way for  the 
marvelous performances of the expert. Admittedly in the 
end, the individual endowment remains the unaccountable 
factor in the problem; and most of us would make a poor 
showing with the seven-leagued boots of genius, were they 
suddenly to  be placed a t  our disposal.” 
“There exists in all intellectual endeavor a period of 
incubation, a process in great part  subconscious, a slow, con- 
cealed maturing through absorption of suitable pabulum. 
Schopenhauer calls it ‘unconscious rumina tion,’ a chewing 
1 Hartrnann. 
330 The Methods of Research 
over and over again of the cud of thought preparatory to 
its assimilation with our mental tissue; another speaks of 
it as the red glow that precedes the white heat. T h e  thesis 
implied by such terms has two aspects : first, that  the process 
of assimilation may take place with suppressed conscious- 
ness; second, that  the larger par t  of the influences that in 
the end determine our mental growth may be effective with- 
out direct exposure to the searching light of conscious life. 
Both principles enforce the view that we develop by living 
in an atmosphere congenial to the occupation that we seek 
to make our own; by steeping ourselves in the details of the 
business that  is to  be our specialty, until the judgment 
is trained, the assimilation sensitized, the perspective of 
importance for the special purpose well established, the 
keenness for  useful improvisation brought to an edge. 
When asked how he came to discover the law of gravita- 
tion, Newton is reported to have answered, ‘By thinking 
about it.’ 
“The scientific spirit-the most finished expression of 
conscious activity-finds its saving balance in the impressible 
imagination-the richest quarry of the subconscious. In all 
character, as in all achievement, there are talents more 
efficient than those consciously exercised, powers deeper than 
those we wittingly command, that  enable us to do  better 
than we know how. This recognition has ever been present 
in the conception of genius, picturing its incomprehensibility 
as an unquestioning response to an inspiration, as a sur- 
render to the natural forces that seethe within, though 
reenforced by experience; as in its labors indifferent to  
means, oblivious to  the why and wherefore, but firmly 
possessed with the imperative importance of its message, 
and leaving lowlier tasks to lesser minds that are constrained 
with painful deliberation to marshal in simple order the 
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limited resources a t  their command. In  this appraisement 
of the constituents of character, of the service of ideals in 
shaping culture, as of the quality of talents that further 
mental achievement, do the traditional wisdom of the ages 
and the analyses of psychology find common issue.” 
“Conscious utilization of subconsciously elaborated data 
remains the normal formula of thought. W e  label the 
product conscious when the drafts upon the reservoir are 
frequent and overt; we call them subconscious when fewer 
and elusive; but we hoId the term peculiarly pertinent when 
the issue conforms more to  purpose and interest than to  
mere capricious revery.’’ 
Dr. Morton Prince’s experience with multiple personali- 
ties lead him to emphasize the phenomenon of coconscious- 
ness; but except for that, his point of view’ is distinctly less 
like that of the psychologist and more like that of other 
scientific men. 
“In what I have said thus f a r  I have had another purpose 
in view than that of a mere exposition of the psycho- 
physiological theory of memory. This  other and chief pur- 
pose has been to lay the foundation for a conception of the 
Unconscious in its larger aspect. W e  have seen that thoughts 
and other conscious experiences that have passed out of 
mind may be and to an enormous extent are conserved and, 
from this point of view, may be properly regarded as simply 
dormant. Further we have seen that all the data collected 
by experimental pathology and other observations lead to  
the conclusion that conservation is effected in the form of 
neurographic residua or brain neurograms-organized physi- 
ological records of passing mental experiences of all sorts 
and kinds. W e  have seen that these neurographic records 
conserve not only our educational acquisitions and general 
‘Prince: “The Unconscious,” 147, 150, 156, 159, 171, 212, 226, 245 (1921). 
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stock of knowledge-all those experiences which we remem- 
ber-but a vast number of others which we cannot spon- 
taneously recall, including, it may be, many which date back 
to early childhood, and many which we have deliberately 
repressed, put out of mind and intentionally forgotten. W e  
have also seen that i t  is not only these mental experiences 
which occupied the focus of our attention that leave their 
counterpart in neurograms, but those as well of which we 
are only partially aware-absent-minded thoughts and acts 
and sensations and perceptions which never entered our 
awareness a t  all-subconscious or coconscious ideas as they 
are called. Finally, we have seen that the mental experiences 
of every state, normal, artificial, or  pathological, whatever 
may be the state of the personal consciousness, are subject 
to the same principle of conservation. In  this way, in the 
course of any one’s natural life, an enormous field of neuro- 
grams is formed representing ideas which f a r  transcend in 
multitude and variety those of the personal consciousness 
a t  any given moment and all moments, and which are far 
beyond the voluntary beck and call of the personal con- 
sciousness of the individual. 
‘(Neurograms are concepts and, by the meaning of the 
concept, they are unconscious. It is not necessary to enter 
into the question whether they are in their ultimate nature 
psychical or  physical. T h a t  is a philosophical question. They 
are a t  any rate unconscious in this sense; they are devoid of 
consciousness, i.e., have none of the psychological attributes 
of any of the elements of consciousness, and in the sense in 
which any physiological arrangement or process is not con- 
scious, Le., is unconscious. W e  have here, then, in the con- 
cept of brain residual neurograms the fundamental meaning 
of the Unconscious. T h e  unconscious is the great  storehouse 
of neurograms which are the physiological records of our 
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mental lives. By the terms of the concept neurograms are 
primarily passive-the potential form, as it were, in which 
psychical energy is stored. This  is not to say, however, that, 
from moment to moment, certain ones out of the great mass 
may not become active processes. On the contrary, according 
to  the theory of memory, when certain complexes of neuro- 
grams are stimulated they take on activity and function-the 
potential energy becomes converted into dynamic energy. In  
correlation with the functioning of such neurographic com- 
plexes, the complexes of ideas which they conserve-the 
psychological equivalents-are reproduced (according to the 
doctrines of monism and parallelism) and enter the stream 
of the personal consciousness. T h e  unconscious becomes the 
conscious (monism), or provided with correlated conscious 
accompaniments (parallelism), and we may speak of the 
ideas arising out of the unconscious. 
Here  two important questions present themselves. It is 
a necessary consequence that when unconscious neurograms 
become active processes psychological equivalents must be 
awakened; and when they are awakened, must they neces- 
sarily enter the stream of the personal consciousness? If 
both these questions may be answered in the negative, then 
plainly in either case such active processes become by defini- 
tion subconscious processes-of an unconscious nature in the 
one case and of a coconscious nature in the other. They 
would be subconscious because in the first place they would 
occur outside of consciousness and there is no awareness of 
them, and in the second place they would be a dissociated 
second train of processes distinct from those engaged in the 
conscious stream of the moment. Theoretically such sub- 
conscious processes, whether unconscious or coconscious, 
might perform a variety of functions according to  the speci- 
ficity of their activities. 
L L  
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“NOW, in preceding lectures, when marshalling the evi- 
dence for conservation, we met with a large number and 
variety of phenomena (automatic writing, hallucinations, 
post-hypnotic phenomena, dreams, ‘unconscious’ solution 
of problems, etc.) , which clearly demonstrated that memory 
might be manifested by processes of which the individual 
was unaware and which were outside the content of con- 
sciousness. Hence these phenomena presented very clear 
evidence of the occurrence of processes that may be properly 
termed subconscious. Attention, however, was primarily 
directed to them only so far  as they offered evidence of 
conservation and of the mode by which conservation was 
effected. But necessarily these evidences were subconscious 
manifestations of forgotten experiences (memory), and in 
so far  as this was the case we saw that unconscious neuro- 
grams can take on activity and function subconsciously; Le., 
without their psychological equivalents (i.e., correlated con- 
scious memory) entering the stream of the personal con- 
sciousness. W e  may now speak of these processes as subcon- 
scious memory. But when their manifestations are care- 
fully scrutinized they will be found to exhibit more than 
memory. They may, for instance, exhibit logical elaboration 
of the original experiences, and what corresponds to fabri- 
cation, reasoning, volition, and affectivity. Theoretically 
this is what we should expect if any of the conserved residual 
experiences of life can function subconsciously. As life’s 
experiences include fears, doubts, scruples, wishes, affections, 
resentments, and numerous other affective states, innate dis- 
positions, and instincts, the subconscious memory process 
necessarily may include any of these affective complexes of 
ideas and tendencies. An affective complex means an idea 
(o r  ideas.) linked to one or  more emotions and feelings. In 
other words, any acquired residua drawn from the general 
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storehouse of life’s experiences may be systematized with 
feelings and emotions, the innate dispositions and instincts 
of the organism. Now it is a general psychological law that 
such affective states tend by the force of their conative im- 
pulses to  carry the specific ideas with which they are syste- 
matized to  fulfillment through mental and bodily behavior. 
Consequently, theoretically, it might thus well be that the 
residua of diverse experiences, say a fear or a wish, by the 
force of such impulses might become activated into very 
specific subconscious processes with very specific tendencies 
expressing themselves in very specific ways, producing very 
specific and diverse phenomena. Thus memory would be 
but one of the manifestations of subconscious processes. 
“Now, as a matter of fact, there are a large number of 
phenomena which not only justify the postulation of sub- 
conscious processes but also the inference that such pro- 
cesses, activated by their affective impulses, may so influence 
conscious thought that  the latter is modified in various ways; 
that  it may be determined in this or  that  direction, inhibited, 
interrupted, distorted, made insistent, and given pathological 
traits. There is also a large variety of bodily phenomena 
which can be explicitly shown to be due to  subconscious 
processes, and many which are only explicable by such a 
mechanism. Indeed, a subconscious process may become very 
complex and constellated with any one or  many of the 
psychological mechanisms of the organism. In special arti- 
ficial and pathological conditions where such processes reach 
their highest development, as manifested through their 
phenomena, they may exhibit that  which when consciously 
performed is understood to be intelligence, comprising rea- 
soning, constructive imagination, volition, and feeling; in 
short, what is commonly called thought or  mental processes. 
Memory, of course, enters as an intrinsic element in these 
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manifestations just as it is an intrinsic element in all thought. 
T h e  automatic script that  describes the memories of a long- 
forgotten childhood experience may a t  the same time reason, 
indulge in jests, rhyme, express cognition and understanding 
of questions-indeed (if put to the test) ,  might not only 
pass a Binet-Simon examination for intelligence, but take a 
high rank in a Civil Service examination. In  these more 
elaborate exhibitions of subconscious intelligence i t  is obvious 
that there is an exuberant efflorescence of the residua de- 
posited in many unconscious fields by life’s experiences and 
synthesized into a subconscious functioning system.” 
“A subconscious process may be provisionally defined as 
one of which the personality i s  unaware, which, therefore, 
i s  outside the personal consciousness, and which is a fac tor  in 
the determination of conscious and bodily phenomena, or 
produces effects analogous t o  those which might be directly 
or indirectly induced by consciousness. I t  would be out of 
the question a t  this time to enter into an exposition of the 
larger subject-the multiform phenomena of the subcon- 
scious, but as its processes are fundamental to an understand- 
ing of many phenomena with which we shall have to deal, 
we should have a clear understanding of the grounds on 
which such processes are postulated as specific, concrete 
occurrences. T h e  classical demonstration of subconscious 
occurrences makes use of certain phenomena of hysteria, 
particularly those of subconscious personalities and artificial 
‘automatic’ phenomena like automatic writing. T h e  epoch- 
making researches of Janet’ on hysterics and almost coin- 
cidentally with him of Edmund Gurney on hypnotics very 
clearly established the fact that  these phenomena are the 
1 Pierre Janet: “L’automatisme psychologique” (1889), and numerous other 
works. 
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manifestations of dissociated processes outside of and inde- 
pendent of the personal consciousness. Among the phe- 
nomena, for  example, are motor activities of various kinds 
such as ordinarily are or  may be induced by conscious intelli- 
gence. As the individual, owing to  anesthesia, may be en- 
tirely unaware even that he had performed any such act, 
the process that performed it must be one that is subcon- 
scious.” 
“A subconscious personality is a condition where com- 
plexes of subconscious processes have been constellated into 
a personal system, manifesting a secondary system of self- 
consciousness endowed with volition, intelligence, etc. Such 
a subconscious personality is capable of communicating with 
the experimenter and describing its own mental processes. 
It can, after repression of the primary personality, become 
the sole personality for  the time being, and then remember 
its previous subconscious life, as we all remember our past 
conscious life, and can give full and explicit information 
regarding the nature of the subconscious process. By mak- 
ing use of the testimony of a subconscious personality and 
its various manifestations, we can not only establish the 
actuality of subconscious processes and their intrinsic nature 
in these conditions, but by prearrangement with this per- 
sonality predetermine any particular process we desire and 
study the modes in which i t  influences conscious thought and 
conduct. F o r  instance, we can prescribe a conflict between 
the subconsciousness and the personal consciousness, between 
a subconscious wish and a conscious wish, or  volition, and 
observe the resultant mental and physical behavior, which 
may be inhibition of thought, hallucinations, amnesia, motor 
phenomena, etc. T h e  possibilities and limitations of sub- 
conscious influences can in this way be experimentally studied. 
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Subconscious personalities, therefore, afford a valuable 
means‘ for studying the mechanism of the mind.” 
“One of these two subjects, while in hypnosis and able 
to recoIIect what goes on in the secondary consciousness, 
thus describes the coconscious process during the spontaneous 
subconscious solution of problems. When a problem on 
which my waking self is engaged remains unsettled, it is still 
kept in mind by the secondary consciousness even though 
put aside by my waking self. M y  secondary consciousness 
often helps me to  solve problems which my waking con- 
sciousness has found difficulty in doing. But it is not my 
secondary consciousness that accomplishes the final solution 
itself, but it helps in the following way: Suppose, for in- 
stance, I am trying to translate a difficult passage in Virgil. 
I work a t  it for some time and am puzzled. Finally, unable 
to do it, I put i t  aside, leaving it unsolved. I decide that it 
is not worth bothering about and so put it out of my mind. 
But it is a mistake to say you put it out of your mind. Wha t  
you do is, you put it into your mind; that is to say you don’t 
put it out of your mind if the problem remains unsolved and 
unsettled. By putting it into your mind I mean that, although 
the waking consciousness may have put it aside, the problem 
still remains in the secondary consciousness. In  the example 
I used, the memory of the passage from Virgil would be 
retained persistently by my secondary consciousness. Then 
from time to time a whole lot of fragmentary memories and 
thoughts connected with the passage would arise in this con- 
1 T h e  value of subconscious personalities for this purpose has been over- 
looked, owing, I suppose, to such conditions being unusual and bizarre, and 
the assumption that  they have little in common with ordinary subconscious 
processes. But it ought to be obvious that in principle it makes little difference 
whether a subconscious system is constellated into a large self-conscious sys- 
tem called a personality, o r  whether it is restricted to a system limited to a 
few particular coconscious ideas. In the former case the possibilities of its 
interfering with the personal consciousness may be more extended and more 
influential, that is all. 
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sciousness. Some of these thoughts, perhaps, would be 
memories of the rules of grammar, or  different meanings 
of words in the passage, in fact, anything I had read, or  
thought, or experienced in connection with the problem 
These would not be logical, connected thoughts, and they 
would not solve the problem. M y  secondary consciousness 
does not actually do this, Le., in the example taken, translate 
the passage. T h e  translation is not effected here. But later 
when my waking consciousness thinks of the problem again, 
these fragmentary thoughts of my secondary consciousness 
arise in my mind, and with this information I complete the 
translation. T h e  actual translation is put together by my 
waking consciousness. I am not conscious of the fact that  
these fragments of knowledge existed previously in my sec- 
ondary consciousness. I do not remember a problem ever 
to have been solved by the secondary consciousness. It is 
always solved by the waking self, although the material for 
solving i t  may come from the secondary. When my waking 
consciousness solves i t  in this way, the solution seems to 
come in a miraculous sort of way, sometimes as if i t  came 
to me from somewhere else than my own mind. I have 
sometimes thought, in consequence, that  I have solved it in 
my sleep. 
“A series of observations conducted with a fourth subject 
(0. N.) gave the following results, briefly summarized. 
(This subject, like the others, is practised in introspection 
and can differentiate her memories with precision.) She dis- 
tinguishes ‘two strata’ in her mental processes (an upper 
and lower). T h e  ‘upper stratum’ consists of the thoughts 
in the focus of attention. T h e  lower (also called the back- 
ground of her mind) consists of the perceptions and thoughts 
which are not in the focus. This stratum, of course, corre- 
sponds with what is commonly recognized as the fringe of 
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consciousness, and, as is usual, when her attention is directed 
elsewhere she is not aware of it. She can, however, bring 
this fringe within the field of attention and then she becomes 
aware of, or  rather remembers, its content during the pre- 
ceding moment. T o  be able to do this is nothing out of the 
ordinary, but what is unusual is this : by a trick of abstraction 
which she has long practised, she can bring the memory of 
the fringe or stratum into the full light of awareness and 
then it is discovered that i t  has been exceedingly rich in 
thoughts, far richer than ordinary attention would show 
and a fringe is supposed to be. It is indeed a veritable 
coconsciousness in which there goes on a secondary stream 
of thoughts often of an entirely different character and 
with different affects from those of the upper stratum. I t  is 
common for thoughts which she has resolutely put out of 
her mind as intolerable or unacceptable, or problems which 
have not been solved, t o  continue functioning in the lower 
stratum without entering awareness. She can, however, a t  
any time become aware of them by the trick of abstraction 
referred to, and sometimes they emerge apparently spon- 
taneously and suddenly replace the ‘upper stratum.’ In  hyp- 
nosis also the content of the lower stratum can be distinctly 
recalled. 
“NOW the point I have been coming to is, the subject has 
acquired the habit of postponing the decision of many every- 
day problems and giving them, as a matter of convenience, 
to this second stratum or fringe to solve. She puts one aside, 
that  is, out of (o r  in to )  her mind and it goes into this 
stratum. Then, later, when the time for action comes, she 
voluntarily goes into abstraction, becomes aware of the sub- 
conscious thoughts of the second stratum and, lo and behold I 
the problem is found to be solved. If a plan of action, all the 
details are found arranged as if planned ‘consciously.’ If 
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asked a moment before what plans had been decided upon 
and decision reached she would have been obliged in her 
conscious ignorance to reply, ‘I don’t know.’ 
“An analysis of these different observations shows, first, 
that the post-hypnotic phenomena-calculations ( a )  and 
actions (b)  -were performed by a subconscious process. Of 
this there can be no manner of doubt, even if the subsequent 
hypnotic memories of the process be rejected as untrust- 
worthy. T h e  phenomenon-the answer to the mathematical 
problem in the one case and the motor acts in the other- 
is so logically related to the suggestion, and can be predicted 
with such certainty, that only a causal relation can be 
admitted. 
“Second, in the calculation phenomena the process is 
clearly of an intellectual character requiring reasoning and 
the cooperation of mathematical memory. (Reasoning is 
more conspicuous when the problem is more complicated, as 
in the calculation of the number of seconds intervening 
between say twenty-two minutes past eleven and seventeen 
minutes past three o’clock.) The  phenomenon is the solu- 
tion of a problem.” 
“I have suggested that the subconscious intelligence may 
be comparable to  the phenomenon of a coconscious per- 
sonality. I t  is worth noting in this connection that in the case 
of Miss B. the coconscious personality, Sally, who claimed 
to be awake while Miss B. was dreaming, also claimed that 
Miss B. sometimes dreamed about what Sally was thinking 
of a t  the moment. In  other words, the thoughts of a large 
systematized coconscious intelligence determined the dream 
just as these thoughts sometimes emerged into Miss B.’s 
mind when awake. T h a t  a coconscious personality may per- 
sist awake while the principal personality is asleep I have 
been able to demonstrate in another case (B. C. A.) .  It was 
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also noted in Dr. Barrows’ case of Anna Winsor. More- 
over, Sally was shown to be a persistent sane coconsciousness 
while Miss B. was delirious and also while she was appar- 
ently deeply etherized and unconscious. After all i t  is diffi- 
cult t o  distinguish in principle the condition of sleep with 
a persisting coconsciousness from a state of deep hypnotic 
trance where the subject is apparently unconscious. In  this 
condition, although the waking consciousness has disap- 
peared, there can be shown to be a persisting ‘secondary’ 
consciousness which can be communicated with by automatic 
writing and which later can exhibit memories of occurrences 
in the environment during the hypnotic trance. (B. C. A.).  
“What has been said does not touch, of course, the other 
mechanisms of the Freudian theory nor the unessential, 
greatly over-emphasized, theory that the subconscious dream 
is always a sexual wish. On the contrary, the principle 
throws a strong, a priori doubt upon the correctness of this 
generalization. I t  is plainly, however, a matter of fact which 
might be easily determined by observation were i t  not for 
the difficulty of correctly referring clinical phenomena to 
the correct antecedent experiences as their causal factors. In  
the last analysis i t  becomes always a matter of interpre- 
tation. 
“Consider certain facts of every-day experiment. A novel 
and difficult question is put up to us for decision. W e  have, 
we will say, to decide whether a certain piece of property 
situated in a growing district of a city shall be sold or  held 
for future development: or  a political manager has to decide 
whether or  not to pursue a certain policy to win an election; 
or the President of the United States has to decide the policy 
of the government in certain land questions in Alaska. Now 
each of us wouId probabIy say that we could not decide such 
a question offhand; we would want time for consideration. 
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If we attempted voluntarily, a t  the moment the question is 
put, to recall to mind all the different facts involved, to con- 
sider the given question from all aspects, t o  switch the main 
facts into their different settings, we would find i t  an im- 
possible thing to do. W e  consequently take the matter ‘under 
advisement,’ t o  use the conventional expression. W e  want 
time. Now what we apparently, and I think undoubtedly, 
do  is to put the problem into our minds and leave it, so to 
speak, t o  incubate. Then, from time to time, as we take up 
the matter for  consideration, the various facts involved in 
the different aspects of the question, and belonging to  their 
different settings, arise to mind. Then we weigh, compare, 
and estimate the value of these different facts and arrive a t  
a judgment. All happens as if subconscious processes had 
been a t  work, as if the problem had been going through a 
subconscious incubation, switching in this and switching in 
that set of facts, and presenting them to consciousness, the 
final selection of the deciding point of view being left to the 
latter. T h e  subconscious garners from the store-house of 
past experiences, those which have a bearing on the question 
and are required for  its solution, brings them into con- 
sciousness, and then our logical conscious processes form the 
judgment. T h e  degree to which subconscious processes in 
this way take par t  in forming judgments would vary accord- 
ing to the mental habits of the individual, the complexity of 
the problem, the affectivity and conflicting character of the 
elements involved. Under this theory we see that there is 
a deeper psychological basis for  the everyday practice of 
taking ‘under advisement’ or  ‘into consideration’ a matter, 
before giving judgment, than would appear on the surface. 
There is considerable experimental evidence in favor of this 
theory. In  discussing above the subconscious solution of 
problems I cited certain evidence obtained from the memo- 
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ries of subjects in hypnosis, for coconscious and unconscious 
processes taking part  in such solutions. I have been able 
to accumulate evidence of this kind showing the co-operation 
of processes outside of consciousness in determining the 
point of view and final judgment of the subject when a 
matter has been under advisement ; particularly when the 
subject has been disturbed by doubts and scruples. It is 
plain that in the final analysis any question on which we 
reserve our judgment is a problem which we put into our 
minds. And, after all, it is only a question of degree and 
afect iv i ty  between the state of mind which hesitates t o  
decide an impersonal question, like a judicial decision, and 
one that  involves a scruple of conscience. This state often 
eventuates in hallucinatory and other phenomena involving 
subconscious processes. Scruples of conscience, i t  is true, 
usually have strong affective elements as constituents, but 
the former may also have them, particularly when involving 
personal ambitions, political principles, etc. 
"If the subconscious processes which perform a mathe- 
matical calculation and other problems, which logically 
determine the symbolism of a dream, etc., can be correctly 
interpreted as unconscious, they plainly exhibited a higher 
order of intelligence than any conscious processes in lower 
animals, or  even some conscious processes of man, like brush- 
ing away a fly." 
I am glad to  have this opportunity to line up with Dr. 
Holmes and others. I n  my own case most of the good ideas 
come as a kind of inspiration and the unconscious reasoning 
seems to me rather better than my conscious reasoning. If 
I could draw oftener on the supra-marginal consciousness, 
it would be distinctly helpful. Of course the ideas that come 
in from somewhere deal with problems with which I am also 
struggling consciously. It does not seem to me necessary 
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t o  postulate a second personality o r  a greatly better mental 
technique. It might be enough that a wider range of facts 
was available a t  a given moment. 
I have tried to show you that there is nothing uncommon 
about this, and that a great many scientific men feel the same 
way. I do not even know whether I am an extreme case or  
not. Since this feeling of a supra-marginal consciousness is 
so strong with many people, how does i t  happen that the 
psychologists ignore it so completely and so consistently? 
A possible explanation has occurred to me. 
One day after the war I was talking to four chemists and 
I made some reference to the subliminal self, not knowing 
a t  that  time that I should have said supra-marginal con- 
sciousness. T o  three of the men the statement was a mere 
common-place. T h e  fourth did not understand what I meant 
and said so. I t  then appeared that he had never had the 
feeling of an inspiration, of an idea coming unexpectedly 
from somewhere to the region of consciousness. H e  had 
worked consciously for all his results and we were speaking 
a language which meant nothing to him. I have wondered, 
since then, whether psychologists as a class are men who 
either do  no unconscious thinking or  whose unconscious 
thinking never comes suddenly into the field of conscious- 
ness. T h a t  would explain all the facts; but I do not know 
whether it is the right explanation. T h e  position taken by 
the psychologists is that  the rest of us are deceiving our- 
selves. T h a t  may be true, but it does not appeal t o  me as 
being probable. One does not see why the minds of some 
psychologists should not work like those of other people ; 
but apparently they do not. So far  as I know, there is no 
urge among color-blind people to become physicists and i t  
is queer that an analogous thing should apparently be char- 
acteristic of psychologists. In  connection with this, one could 
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very well use the quotation from John Buchan as a test. 1 
think that that paragraph would strike a responsive chord 
in a great many people and that to  others i t  would be quite 
meaningless. Would the majority of the psychologists come 
quite overwhelmingly in one of these classes? I have also 
wondered whether perhaps feminine intuition may not be 
due to the fact that the unconscious reasoning comes into 
consciousness more often with women than with men. 
W e  know that there are many cases where actions take 
place without there being normal consciousness.’ “Of con- 
ditions conforming to this status the most familiar is som- 
nambulism. As a modification or accident of sleep, it presents 
an altered disposition of brain-functioning, whereby a part  
of the mental machinery is set into action without arousing 
the rest. T h e  mental condition of the somnambulist is an 
interesting one, and not so much for what it leads him to do, 
as for  his attitude and sensibilities while thus occupied. H e  
is manifestly not wholly awake; his senses respond to  a 
peculiarly circumscribed range of stimuli, and his actions 
make no report to  that phase of consciousness upon which 
his waking memory depends. Unmistakable circumstantial 
proof falls short of completely convincing him that it was 
he who performed in sleep the versatile achievements that 
the normal memory so completely repudiates, for the very 
reason that the sleep-acting self is not the self-not the 
complete self-that conducts the introspective inquiry. 
“The objective evidence is fortunately quite definite. 
There is in the older literature the record of a sleep-walker 
whose inquiring friends tested his powers while engaged in 
his nocturnal excursions. With a restricted type of aware- 
ness, he saw and felt and recognized familiar objects, and 
behaved toward them in routine, partly intelligent fashion. 
Jastrow : “The Subconscious,” 267 ( 1 9 0 6 ) .  
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If a pipe were placed in his hands, the somnambulist handled 
it correctly, but could not light i t ;  if i t  were lighted for him, 
the pipe went out because he did not inhale properly. H e  
could be induced to  sit a t  a table and go through the actual 
movements of writing. If given a book, he turned its pages, 
resting his gaze on each page, but without reading; and he 
continued in this automatic mimicry if  the light were with- 
drawn. When forcibly aroused, he was shocked to  find him- 
self out of bed and in the presence of his friends. H a d  he 
awakened of his own accord, he might, with equal sudden- 
ness, have come to  himself and without memory of his 
immediate occupation. 
“Observations of this general import have been sufficiently 
verified to establish that the somnambulist is suggestible; 
that  to some extent an appeal to his senses arouses appro- 
priate response; that  he, in part, appreciates the felt and 
seen positions and nature of things; and that his reactions, 
though automatic, reflect a simply intelligent yet limited 
adaptation to routine situations. They show further that  
spontaneously he takes cognizance only of that  particular 
area of sensations and movements that  fits in with his self- 
imposed quest. T h e  somnambulist, bent upon finding a lost 
object, avoids obstacles, manipulates latches and locks and 
keys and doors and drawers, finds the proper material in 
the kitchen for  washing dishes or  baking a pie, but is in- 
sensitive to the happenings about him, does not hear or  see 
the person who, with lighted candle, is approaching to 
awaken him, and is likely to stumble against any familiar 
object, and unintelligently to fumble about the knob of the 
door that, without his knowledge, has been locked to prevent 
his escape. Thus thwarted in his purpose, he may wander 
back to bed without awakening; yet a sufficiently violent 
stimulus breaks through the narrow circle of his contracted 
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perceptions, and brings him to normal wakefulness. Many 
a somnambulist who is aware of his failing, and who has 
found it unavailing to lock the door and to hide the key (the 
nocturnal consciousness being quite equal both to securing 
the key and to opening the door) ,  has resorted to the expe- 
dient of dropping the key into a basin of cold water, relying 
upon the shock, when the sleeper’s hands were plunged into 
the water, to awaken him. This group of possibilities and 
limitations of mental behavior sufficiently establishes the 
close affiliation of natural somnambulism to other conditions, 
and especially to hypnosis, and indicates that what they have 
distinctly in common is the general type of mental disinte- 
gration that permits the spontaneous o r  suggested episode 
to be enacted without sanction or  knowledge of the normally 
directing stage-manager.” 
Seashore’ says that “sleep-walking occurs only in deep 
sleep. Many apparently fabulous stories of feats in sleep- 
walking are found true. A college student formed the habit 
of getting up in sleep, dressing, walking down to the Mis- 
sissippi River three-quarters of a mile distance, undressing, 
taking a deliberate and enjoyable swim, dressing, walking 
back to his room, undressing and retiring, only to wake up in 
the morning without the slightest inkling of remembrance 
from the escapade of the night. But when his friends con- 
stituted themselves detectives and awakened him suddenly 
in the act, the whole performance stood out clear to him in 
his memory. Sleep-walking is dream-action. If a sleep- 
walker is allowed to return to  bed without being awakened, 
he will have no memory of the dream action in the morning.” 
I had an interesting experience myself in my freshman 
year. I was playing on the freshman eleven and we were 
practising with the varsity. T h e  varsity was not a very good 
1 “Introduction to Psychology,” 368 (1923) .  
How to Think 349 
team that year and on that day it was particularly bad. T h e  
men were missing all sorts of tackles. Finally the full-back, 
who was a good player, made up his mind that  he would 
down the next man who got through to  him and down him 
hard. Fo r  some unknown reason I was the next man and 
the full-back stood me on my head in a good, workman-like 
manner. I can remember people telling me that I had better 
stop playing, which did not appeal to me. I finally convinced 
people that I was not hurt and the game went on. T h e  next 
thing that I can remember, I could both see and hear. W e  
were lined up in the middle of the field; but the man in front 
of me was not the man who had been playing opposite me 
when I got hurt. H e  was the regular end who had not been 
able to get out on time. I got that  mysterious thing straight- 
ened out without asking any questions. T h e  next time I came 
to, I could hear but I could not see. I had the football in 
my hands, though I could not see it, and people were dis- 
cussing some play. By listening I learned that I had made 
a fair catch; but that  perhaps I had been offside. At that 
time the ball had to be kicked after a fair catch and I 
remember wondering how I was going to kick a ball I could 
not see. T h a t  difficulty never arose, because it was ruled 
that I was off side. T h e  ball was taken away from me and my 
memories cease until the game was over and we started to  
walk off the field. I was then able both to  see and to hear. 
W e  had to  go across Holmes field to get to the gymnasium. 
I remember stepping over the low fence surrounding Jarvis 
field and the next thing I was going up the steps of Hemen- 
way gymnasium. I had walked across Holmes field in a state 
of apparent unconsciousness without the people I was with 
noticing anything abnormal. In fact I was told that I had 
played better football that  afternoon than ever before. 
If one admits my account of what happened that after- 
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noon, there must have been a great deal of mental and 
physical adjustment which was independent of normal con- 
sciousness, and the solving of problems in the supra-marginal 
consciousness may be another form of the same thing. T h e  
psychologist takes the ground that my account of what 
happened is grossly inaccurate. H e  believes that I could see 
and hear all the time; but that  there were interesting lapses 
of memory. This may be true. It is well-known that after 
an accident there is very often a loss of memory as to events 
preceding the accident. I t  does not seem to me that the 
episode of the ball which I could feel but not see comes 
within that category. I believe that, as a result of shock, 
I was in a state somewhat analogous to somnambulism or 
hypnotism, and that things happened substantially as I have 
described them. T h e  experiments of Dr.  Morton Prince on 
disintegrated personality do not bear directly upon this; 
but they do illustrate the general principle that one can 
have thought and knowledge quite independent of normal 
consciousness. 
Since we cannot a t  present control our unconscious think- 
ing, it seems to be a matter of accident or  fate whether a 
good idea comes into the field of consciousness. It is that, 
together with the belief in law, that makes scientific men 
believe more or  less strongly in predestination quite apart  
from golf. T h a t  does not mean that we can sit down and 
wait, because the ideas do  not come to those who do not 
work. It is on the knees of the gods whether there will be 
a loose ball in the football field in any particular game; but 
that  accident will not mean a touchdown unless there has 
been a great deal of preliminary training. Mere natural 
alertness is not adequate. 
When I first came back from Germany over forty-five 
years ago, I started some work on mass law relations in 
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systems like benzene, alcohol and water, where there could 
be two liquid layers. I thought then and still think that it 
was the best work I was ever likely to do. Nobody else, 
not even my close personal friends, thought it was any good 
a t  all. T h a t  was quite natural. I had a fractional exponent 
for which I could not and cannot now account, and frac- 
tional exponents were taboo before the days of the adsorp- 
tion isotherm. I also ran counter, without explanation, to  
many of the things that the physical chemists held most 
sacred in those days. People were interested in variations 
from the' gas laws and from normal molecular weights. 
Alcohol in benzene was known to be thoroughly abnormal. 
It still is. It was not reasonable to  suppose that addition of 
water, an associated liquid, could do anything but increase 
the abnormality of the results and yet benzene, alcohol and 
water fitted into a simple formula over the whole range of 
concentrations with an error not to exceed one-tenth of one 
per cent. T h e  thing was impossible and the most charitable 
view was that I was deluding myself. 
If I could have straightened the thing out a t  that  time, 
people would probably have cited me as another case of 
genius manifesting itself early. As it  is, I am not cited as a 
case of genius a t  all. I reached the point where I did not 
know what to  do next, and we dropped the subject for a 
quarter of a century or more. Quite recently the clouds 
lifted and I saw what to  do next. W e  are working on the 
problem again. Even now I do not see through to  the end. 
If the gods are willing, we shall finish the matter up in a 
few years. If the fog closes down again, as it may, the 
problem will be left to  some better man to  solve. 
It is because we realize how much of the results depend 
upon factors outside our control, that  the scientific man does 
not, as a rule, have a swelled head. T h e  night before we 
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sailed for Galveston we heard Walter Hampden in King 
Henry V. After the curtain goes down, the English soldiers 
sing a t  night on the field of Agincourt. T h e  scientific man 
might perhaps word it a little differently; but the sentiment 
would be the same in the two cases. T h e  soldiers sang the 
11 5th Psalm: “Non nobis, domine, non nobis, sed nomini 
tuo da gloriam.” 
WILDER D. BANCROFT. 

